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Discussions about the KORUS FTA began in the mid-1980s; however, due to the immaturity 
of domestic motivation to push forward, full-scale talks didn’t begin until 2004. The KORUS 
FTA, the negotiations for which began in June of 2006, with additional negotiations in 2007, 
was officially signed in late June of 2007. The KORUS FTA is expected to have a major 
impact on the Korean economy relative to the other FTAs that have already been established. 
It is also expected to have a significant impact on trade by Korea and on FTA policies as a 
whole.
Within the framework of the KORUS FTA, there are sensitive issues, but the general 
consensus is that it is considerably in agreement with Korea’s national interests through 
its coverage and its high level of market access. It is generally viewed that the agreement 
was improved in many aspects and that the risks of implementing the sensitive points were 
minimized by way of exceptions and added terms. However, based on differing perspectives 
on establishing an FTA with the US, some radical evaluations have begun to appear. 
This paper aims to evaluate the KORUS FTA by analyzing the process involved, the main 
issues raised during the negotiations, and its economic impact. In the conclusion section, the 
author points out the need to strengthen the Korean trade policy system with the beef crisis 
as the stimulus for this, so as to foster the growth of communications between civic groups 
and interested parties and to solidify the convergence of opinions. Also discussed is the 
need for the early ratification and execution of a reasonable agreement to realize the gains 
expected from the KORUS FTA. 
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I. INTRoDUcTIoN
The Republic of Korea has signed Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with 
multiple nations. Thus far, Korea has signed treaties with chile (effective as 
of April, 2004), Singapore (effective as of March, 2006), the European Free 
Trade Association (effective as of September, 2006), and the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN; effective as of June, 2007). Agreements 
with the European Union, India, canada, and Mexico are underway. The 
FTA with the United States had been under examination since 2003, when 
Korea finalized the “FTA Propulsion Roadmap.” Some degree of examination 
was conducted intermittently before 2003; however, due to the unfavorable 
domestic and foreign situations at the time, progress was difficult. In 2004, 
Korea began to contact the US actively to establish bilateral discussions on 
the matter. In 2005, the US and Korea held working-level FTA discussions 
three times, and on the basis of these, both sides announced that official 
negotiations would be held in early 2006. The time taken for Korean-US free 
trade agreement (KoRUS-FTA) negotiations was relatively brief compared 
to that needed for other FTAs and given that such a comprehensive FTA 
contained rather many sensitive issues. 
Furthermore, many expect a considerable economic impact as a result of 
the KoRUS-FTA; due to its exemplary form of market access designs along 
with its advanced trade policies, it is expected to have a great impact on 
Korea’s future FTA and trade policies. Establishing an FTA with the world’s 
largest market, the US, allows amplified possibilities for Korean businesses 
to advance into the American market, which can ultimately support Korean 
businesses as they attempt to advance into other foreign markets. In fact, the 
records of actual exports to American distributors are widely known to be 
used as references when consulting about exports with other nations. 
The process of establishing the KoRUS-FTA has been fraught with 
domestic resistance due to the sensitive topics it contains. Many opposing 
factions criticized the very nature of the FTA, the opening of markets, and 
the related deregulation plans. However, some opposed the KoRUS-FTA 
regardless of the content of the agreement, simply because the policy partner 
was the US. Meanwhile, the authorities’ attempt to settle on the agreement 
 Economic Assessment of the KoREA–US FTA 35
before the expiration of the American TPA (Trade Promotion Act) resulted in 
tense public hearings. In addition, the authorities’ leading the public to think 
that the processes were being rushed worked against the gaining of public 
support. 
The principal goal of this paper is to examine the KoRUS-FTA objectively 
while placing much emphasis on analyzing the overall process of the 
agreement. Most existing domestic papers focus on the macroeconomic 
aspects of the KoRUS-FTA, while discussions of the historical aspects of 
the agreement are scarce. Because the KoRUS-FTA is substantial relative 
to Korea’s other FTAs, for example with chile or Singapore, it is impossible 
to examine every aspect of it in detail. Nonetheless, this paper is an attempt 
to analyze the KoRUS-FTA quantitatively and qualitatively by historically 
examining it from the time of its negotiation to the time of its settlement. 
II. coURSE oF PRoMoTINg THE KoRUS-FTA 
1. Background
Today, FTAs perform a very important role at the center of the WTo’s 
multilateral trade system; it is no exaggeration to say that every member 
state of the WTo promotes FTAs. china is the latest nation to join the realm 
of FTAs, and as of June of 2008, it has already entered into seven FTAs. The 
trade authorities of countries such as those in the Middle East and Africa and 
even Mongolia are among the many that are also actively pushing to establish 
FTAs. Why do all of these nations want FTAs? generally, nations promote 
FTAs for many reasons, but it can be interpreted that most promote FTAs to 
improve their economy by increasing exports, investments, and advancing 
trade policies. They also stress the importance of promoting FTAs because 
they don’t want to face losses by not riding the worldwide FTA wave.1
generally, the economic gains made through the FTA depend on the size, 
structure, and the growth of the partnering nation’s economy. Usually, FTAs 
with nations with a high trade barrier and advanced trade policies will bring 
1 As of August, 2008, there are total of 213 FTAs in the world. 
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greater economic gain. A more inclusive agreement leads to a larger economic 
effect. The US is the world’s largest economy, accounting for 20% of the 
world’s gross domestic product. generally, the US promotes an all-inclusive 
FTA; thus, one can expect a highly positive economic effect if one enters into 
an FTA with the US. However, it is true that actual economic gains can only 
be calculated once the agreed-upon framework of the FTA is analyzed. 
In 2003, when Korea officials contacted the US to review the FTA, 
Americans viewed the Korea’s will to push for the FTA to be low and considered 
the Korea-chile FTA to be an ordinary trade agreement. Furthermore, they 
considered the Korea’s trade policies to be overprotective. As such, they 
underestimated the economic gains made by the US through the FTA. Later, 
when Korea successfully entered into agreements with Singapore, EFTA, and 
ASEAN, and promoted FTAs with canada, Mexico, and India, the US finally 
began to view the Korea’s will to be high. Meanwhile, the US most likely 
felt some degree of threat from the rise of china and the deterioration of 
Korea-US relations, meaning that the KoRUS-FTA would fulfill the need to 
strengthen the strategic alliance between the two nations. 
The US has entered into an FTA with only a few nations, mainly due to 
the fact that there are not many nations like the US that can promote such 
comprehensive trade agreements. In addition, it simply is not easy to find 
nations with the trade agreement experience and negotiating manpower 
of the US. The US has secured many experienced commerce professionals 
and specialists in the field, which the other nations lack. In addition, in the 
case of the US, the power to push for an FTA is held by the US congress, 
which makes it difficult for the US to concede in negotiations; that is, 
the US congress holds authority over trade policy, which is an authentic 
characteristic that only the US has. The US congress, under special 
circumstances, is granted Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) by the executive 
branch. Therefore, the US has a very limited time frame for promoting any 
type of trade agreement, not only because it needs approval from congress, 
but also because any negotiation can only begin once TPA is granted.  
Let’s turn our attention to the Korea’s promotion of FTAs. Approximately 
ten years ago, when Korea was negotiating an FTA for the first time with 
chile, there were not many experienced commerce professionals. Therefore, 
more time was spent on examining agreement drafts and analyzing 
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concessions. In turn, negotiations took longer than expected. Later, five 
to six FTAs were simultaneously promoted or examined, which pushed 
the Korean government to sharpen its focus, specifically on the trade and 
commerce field. More than 30 professionals were openly recruited at this 
point. For the KoRUS-FTA, the Korean government employed more than 
300 professionals. Along with indirect support from the Korean National 
Policy Research Institute and other private institutions, the total number 
of personnel involved in the affair exceeded 500. We cannot say with any 
confidence that we have secured a sufficient number of professionals, but we 
can at least say that we have sufficient manpower to carry out KoRUS-FTA 
preparations and negotiations without major setbacks. In the real KoRUS-
FTA negotiations, the American negotiating team publicly spoke highly of 
the Korean negotiation staff and their well-prepared content and attitudes at 
the table. The results of the actual negotiations support such compliments; 
after the negotiation, it is true that public support for the KoRUS-FTA 
was greater than opposition; The Korean economists praised the KoRUS-
FTA negotiations as one of the greatest outcomes of the Roh Moo-Hyun 
administration. The KoRUS-FTA was evaluated as a necessary policy, 
because both its content and its timeliness are expected to have a positive 
impact on the Korean economy. 
For Korea, which has already entered into FTAs with numerous nations, 
there is a need to seek greater, higher-quality FTAs to increase economic 
gains. From 2000 to 2005, Korea experienced the world’s fastest FTA 
promotion rate, and the Korean government was called upon to take a more 
active role in promoting FTAs following reports on the negative economic 
effects of FTAs published by trade organizations such as KoTRA (Korea 
Trade-Investment Promotion Agency). Those who called on the Korean 
government were mainly financial institutions, and those institutions 
emphasized the need for Korea to enter into FTAs with larger economies, 
such as the US or the EU. 
Meanwhile, there was a need for Korea to improve the quality of FTAs. 
There were many voices advocating centering the Korean FTAs on the service 
industry, development, investment, and liberalized trade policies. These voices 
expected that by including these factors in the KoRUS FTA, Korea would not 
only advance its economy but would also make it more transparent.
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During this time, the Roh administration set as its primary goal to raise 
the national per capita income to $20,000 through the KoRUS FTA. The Roh 
administration realized that the goal was only realistically reachable with 
improvements to the service industry, which made up over 70% of the Korean 
economy. Thus, it is no exaggeration that the promotion of the KoRUS FTA 
was possible owing to the Roh administration’s hope to advance the Korea’s 
service industry and its economic competitiveness. The service industry has 
many regulations by nature and maintains established business methods 
and practices which have sprung from those regulations while protecting 
the profits of interested parties. In other words, while the service industry 
is guaranteed to grow with countless regulations as its catalyst, despite 
changes in the trade environment, it cannot actually aid in the development 
of the economy. According to a study conducted by the World Bank in 2007 
on changes in the business environments of 178 nations between April 
of 2006 and June of 2007, Korea placed 30th, a drop of seven places from 
the previous year’s rank.2 It is true that the Korean government has been 
improving the business environment; however, studies show that because 
other nations have been improving at a faster rate, the business environment 
of Korea has actually regressed. It was also found that the initial expenses of 
a typical Korean company were around 16.9% of the gNI per capita, which 
is approximately 5.1% higher than the oEcD average. Korea placed 131st in 
employment (a one place drop from the previous year), and 64th in investor 
protection (a two place drop from the previous year). Due to the active 
promotion of the FTA, trade placed 13th, a significant 17-place jump from the 
previous year. Regardless, the Korea’s service industry ranks among the lowest 
internationally.
Today, the service industry of a nation impacts the productivity of the 
manufacturing industry. The service industry, especially in the fields of 
education, medicine, law, accounting, and design, shows parallel growth to 
that of the manufacturing industry. Thus, the service industry is important in 
2 Meanwhile, according to the global competitiveness Report 2007-2008 by the World 
Economic Forum, Korea’s national competitiveness jumped to 11th place from 23rd 
place last year. This sort of business environment improvement is credited with having 
impacted the signing of the KoRUS FTA. 
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the development of the manufacturing industry. once the wall of regulations 
is lowered, more investors will enter the market, which in turn, develops 
the service industry. That means that the foreign impact is necessary for the 
development of the service industry; once foreign investors compete against 
domestic investors and corporations, domestic players are stimulated to 
elevate their competitiveness. The Korean government firmly believed that 
FTAs would contribute to the advancement of the service industry. Luckily, 
some sectors in the service industry, such as law and accounting, were 
included in the KoRUS FTA, but very controversial sectors such as education 
and medicine were excluded. Due to such results, it was originally concluded 
that the opening of the service industry was insufficient. Later, the Korean 
government announced a plan to liberalize the service industry sectors, which 
were not included in the KoRUS FTA, but generally, the plan is considered to 
be too unrealistic. 
Some criticize the inexperience and the unpreparedness of the Korea’s 
rushed promotion of the KoRUS FTA. It is certainly true that a couple 
more years of preparation would have brought better results, although, that 
does not speak to the excellent timeliness of the KoRUS FTA. considering 
the conditions of promoting the KoRUS FTA from the Korea’s side, it was 
deemed to be more reasonable to promote the FTA with sympathy with the 
US as the background. 
Some criticize the government for starting KoRUS FTA negotiations 
without any plans for industries which are impacted negatively. It is true 
that “sufficient advance preparations” are difficult for any FTA. First, in 
accordance with the results of the negotiations, each party to the negotiation 
calculates and estimates the cost of countermeasures of any losses. Therefore, 
it is difficult to prepare a damage prevention plan in advance. In addition, 
advanced preparation to prevent losses would mean that the Korean 
industries would be equipped with greater international competitiveness, but 
any nation with this level of international competitiveness would not need 
to promote FTAs. In the first days of 2007, a National Assembly member 
released one of my own reports on FTAs, which received much attention from 
the press. This report was prepared in 2005, when the Korean government 
was actively promoting the KoRUS FTA. It provided a model that converted 
the theoretical pressure from restructuring after concluding the FTA into 
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unemployment numbers using economic models.3
Although it is undeniable that more jobs will be created by signing the 
KoRUS FTA, this study was implemented to estimate the level of transitory 
unemployment (the pressure from restructuring) as a result of the shift of 
the employment of manpower from less competitive industries to developing 
industries and the cost of re-employing the manpower necessary to support 
the policy management activities pertaining to trade regulations. Actually, 
the Korean government referenced the results of this study when they 
enacted the Trade Regulation Support Policy for the first time in April of 
2006. The Korean government had enacted regulations and policies to help 
the affected workers and businesses, and they had already secured a budget 
of approximately $110,000,000,000 for the agriculture industry. This budget 
was originally a countermeasure to the opening of the agricultural industry 
through agendas such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). However, 
the Korean government, in an effort to ease the burden of losses due to the 
FTA in the agriculture industry smoothly, retouched the budget plan and 
decided the additional aid would be dispersed after the KoRUS FTA was 
signed. 
It is possible to argue that the proposition to subsidize the agriculture 
industry and the 2006 Trade Regulation Support Policy were insufficient 
to cover all losses and damage due to the KoRUS FTA. Nevertheless, it 
is expected that when subsidizing the losses and damage caused by the 
opening of the market, the Korean government must apply the following 
three standards. First, it must reference the WTo’s Subsidy Agreement. 
Unlike the situation in the past, today the WTo has set firm limits on how 
much a member state may receive in subsidies in times of need. It is also 
gradually decreasing these limits. As Korea requires more financial support 
to promote its trade agreements, it encounters the problem of having to 
reduce its financial support in other areas. Next, Korea must calculate the 
required subsidies based on statistics from past cases of other nations. 
3 cheong In Kyo (2005) “FTA Promotion and Trade Restructuring ”Ministry of 
commerce, Industry and Energy sponsored, “Public Hearing on the Manufacture 
Industry and Trade Restructuring Support” Presentation Documents (August 31, The 
Korea chamber of commerce and Industry conference Room)
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Although American financial support is considered to be excellent, such 
support primarily focuses on secondary support to train and consult for the 
unemployed, instead of giving hard currency. Lastly, Korea must consider 
its own current economic status. one may agree with the idea of actively 
supporting the weak and vulnerable classes, but the size of such support must 
be calculated and adjusted in accordance with the current economic status 
of the nation. It is irrational to support these classes actively if that support 
endangers the economic status of the state.4
2. Progress5
a. Discussions, 1980-90s
In the 1980s, the US began to show interest in establishing bilateral trade 
relations with Korea, as it was worried about the possible growth of the 
national deficit and the weakening of its international competitiveness. 
Meanwhile, Korea responded to the US-led promotion of the FTA by 
organizing domestic research groups centered on professionals from the 
National Policy Institute. 
In April of 1984, representatives from the USTR and gATT suggested 
a review of the KoRUS FTA. At the time, the Uruguay Round negotiations 
were not as fruitful as was hoped; thus, the US not only pushed forward an 
FTA with canada to counter the plan to unify the European markets, but 
they also reviewed the possibilities of establishing FTAs with major East 
Asian nations. According to a report by the USITc which examined Asian-
Pacific FTAs in 1989, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan were considered to 
be the most appropriate countries with which to enter into a FTA. Later, 
the US determined that the Singaporean market was too small and would 
be unprofitable and that it would be inadequate to enter into an FTA with 
4 For instance, Korea’s gross agricultural output in 2006 was approximately 26 trillion 
won, whereas the government subsidy for the agriculture industry was 16 trillion won. 
In addition, considering Korea’s current economic status, the amount of the subsidy 
cannot be considered insufficient. 
5 Based on the author’s contributing works (cheong In Kyo 1998-2005) on the KoRUS 
FTA.
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Taiwan.6 Among these three counties, it is true that Korea was considered 
ideal, but due to the strong anti-American sentiment in Korea, the actual 
push for an agreement was judged to be difficult. 
Nevertheless, following the report, numerous studies were conducted 
on the potential for a KoRUS FTA, resulting in the creation of the Korea 
International Trade Association and the Korea Institute for Industrial 
Economics & Trade. However, follow-up studies were seldom, if ever, 
conducted, which further impeded the trade authorities’ full understanding 
of the FTA. Moreover, discussions of FTAs were not able to continue due 
to domestic sentiments and the inclusion of the opening of the agriculture 
industry in the Uruguay Round. During the Kim Young-Sam era, there were 
times when trade professionals were called to review the potential of entering 
into an FTA with the US. In 1996, the globalization Promotion committee 
even studied FTAs and conducted a potential economic analysis of the 
KoRUS FTA, which was revised and supplemented by Wang, Yun Jong and 
cheong, In Kyo to be published in the Korea’s Current Economic Reviews and 
Outlook in 1998.7
In 1998, as Korean government reviewed the Korea-chile FTA, there 
were talks about the KoRUS FTA. However, because the Korean government 
lacked the knowledge and the experience in FTA negotiations, it concluded 
that it was wiser to enter into an FTA with a smaller economy; that is, the 
Korean government would promote FTAs, with chile being its first FTA 
partner, and afterward review the potential of entering agreements with 
Japan, Thailand, New Zealand and others. Even as such studies and reviews 
were being conducted, the American chamber of commerce in Korea 
delivered letters urging the clinton administration to enter into an FTA with 
Korea.
6 However, in 2000, the US agreed to promote a FTA with Singapore and began 
negotiations in 2001 that resulted in the signing of the agreement in 2002. It is 
presumed that the US entered into an FTA with Singapore to strengthen its service 
industry and gain more access to East Asian markets.
7 Wang Youn Jong, cheong In Kyo, “Establishment of the Korea-US Free Trade Zone 
and its Economic Implications” Current Economic Reviews and Outlook, Volume 4, 2nd 
Edition, 1998, pp. 135-188.
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b. Discussions after 2000
In April of 2000, the Korean government announced the results of a joint 
study of a Korea-Japan FTA and began the negotiations of the Korea-chile 
FTA. The discussions of the potential of a Korea-Japan FTA worried many 
American corporations. This, in turn, pushed the US to urge the early 
settlement of both the Korea-US Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and the 
KoRUS FTA at the 14th Annual Korea-US Business council meeting held in 
Hawaii in January of 2001. Meanwhile, the American agriculture industry, 
which was highly interested in exporting American agricultural goods and 
products, including beef, urged Senator Max Baucus to promote the KoRUS 
FTA. As a result, in late 2000, Senator Baucus requested a feasibility study on 
the KoRUS FTA from the USITc. As the US began its feasibility study on 
the agreement, Korea began to do the same. In 2001 and 2002, such studies 
were conducted independently by each nation; however, given the immature 
conditions, these studies were not able to develop into an official discussion 
of the agreement.
In the 2002 Korea presidential election the incumbent party maintained 
its majority, with Roh Moo-Hyun as its head, but the new administration’s 
transition committee did not put much priority on reviewing Roh’s FTA 
policies. Rather, it focused much of its attention on constructing a North East 
Asian economic sphere, which made discussions of FTAs more opaque than 
ever. Nonetheless, after four or five months in power, the Roh administration 
began to show a distinct interest in promoting FTAs and therefore started to 
put some effort into ratifying the Korea-chile FTA. In September of 2003, 
the Roh administration made the “FTA Promotion Roadmap” one of its 
priorities.8 This roadmap included plans to promote FTAs with the US, EU, 
china, and other larger economies. 
As a result, confirming the FTA Roadmap expedited the Korea-Japan FTA. 
Thus, in october of 2003 at the APEc Summit Meeting, Korea and Japan 
jointly announced the beginning of their FTA negotiations.9 The Korea-Japan 
8 According to this roadmap, at the time, the Korea set FTAs with Singapore and Japan 
as a short-term goal and FTAs with the US, EU, china, and other larger economies as 
a long-term goal.
9 The Korea-Japan FTA forums were operated from May of 2001 to the early 2002. 
Beginning in June of 2002, the Industrial, governmental, an Academia Joint Research 
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Table 1. Schedule of the KoRUS FTA
Date Event Title Venue
Stage of FTA 
Probes and 
Preparations
2003. 8. 30 conclusion of the FTA road map Seoul
2004. 11.19 The KoRUS trade ministerial meeting- 








2005.02-06.11 6 sessions of the KoRUS trade ministerial 
meeting
geneva, etc.
2006.01.18 President Roh, Moo-hyun’s New Year’s 
Address 
(The KoRUS FTA negotiations announced)
Seoul
2006.02.02 Public hearing on the KoRUS FTA- 
Resolution on external meeting of 
economic ministers
Seoul
2006.03.07 Korean government- Decision on screen 
quota reduction
Seoul


















2007.03.26-4.1 Trade minister-level negotiation/ Summit 
telephone negotiation (March 30)
Seoul
2007.03.26-4.1 Final agreement Seoul
2007.06 Additional negotiation on new trade policy
Signing 2007.06.30 official signing of the FTA document Seoul
Stage of FTA 
Ratification
2007.09.07 government- Submission of the FTA ratifi-
cation proposal to the National Assembly
Seoul
2008.06.26 Notification of U.S. beef inspection and 
quarantine criteria
Seoul
2008.08.06 KoRUS summit talk- consensus of joint 
actions for this year's congressional ratification
Seoul
2008.08.19 consensus of congressional 
leadership formation
Seoul
Data: Prepared by author
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FTA negotiations began in December of 2003. However, they fell out of favor, 
largely due to the disagreement between the two countries on the opening of 
each other’s agriculture sector, eventually leading to the discontinuance of the 
negotiations after a year. From the perspective of Korea, the Korea-Japan FTA 
was meaningless if it did not include a section of the agreement guaranteeing 
economic benefits to Korea from the Japanese side.
Meanwhile, by the end of 2003, in the middle of the Korea-Japan 
negotiations, the Korea-chile FTA seemed uncertain. This meant that Korea 
was in a situation to put forth the FTA Promotion Roadmap, which was 
finalized in September of 2003, and began its search of ways to promote 
multiple FTAs simultaneously. It was in this period that Korea began actively 
to look at the potential of the KoRUS FTA. Although the results were 
unfruitful, representatives from each nation even held informal meetings 
on the issue. At this time, the US made it clear that the KoRUS FTA could 
not be politically promoted while BIT negotiations were not progressing as 
a result of the disagreement about the screen quota. However, after May of 
2004, the US began to hold rather optimistic views. In November of the same 
year, the US government even hosted a joint meeting to discuss the potential 
of the KoRUS FTA during the Korea-US commerce Summit Meeting held in 
Santiago.
In the early days of the KoRUS FTA discussions, the discussants were 
comprised of mainly public workers, and the primary focus of the meetings 
was to communicate what each party hoped to gain through the negotiations. 
Field-specific discussions mainly included tariffs, agriculture, textiles, 
government procurement, rules of origin, trade remedies, intellectual 
property, the financial sector, the service industry, investment, telecom, 
electronic trade, competition policies, labor, the environment, and other 
topics. Both parties analyzed the other’s stance on the contending issues and 
used the analysis to prepare a report to be used during the negotiations. 
From 2004 to 2005, the roles of high ranking officials, including the 
commerce minister, congressmen, and economic organization presidents, 
were crucial in shaping the environment for the promotion of the KoRUS 
committee was organized to discuss the feasibility of and the directions for promoting 
the agreement. 
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FTA. This group specifically contacted several high-ranking American 
officials, including opinion leaders, members of congress, and commerce 
department officials.10 Unlike other FTAs, representatives from the Federation 
of Korean Industries, the Korean International Trade Association, and the 
chamber of commerce and Industries met with their American counterparts 
and actively put some effort into promoting the KoRUS FTA. Ultimately, by 
September of 2005, the US had to prioritize the promotion of the KoRUS 
FTA. 
c. Promotion of KORUS FTA after 2006
Starting in 2006, promotion of the KoRUS FTA began to accelerate. once 
Korea decided on its policy negotiation terms, it broke the tradition of having 
a minister-level official announce the need for a KoRUS FTA by having 
the president himself speak publicly to the people. At the end of 2005, the 
negotiation date was undecided, but in early 2006, both sides agreed to hold 
the first meeting in February of the same year. This resulted in a delay of 
many public hearings and minister-level economic conferences. Finally, on 
February 2nd, 2006, the first public hearing on the KoRUS FTA promotion 
was held, and in the afternoon of the same day, during a minister-level 
economic conference, numerous ministers from various ministries confirmed 
their plan to promote the KoRUS FTA. once legal procedures to promote the 
KoRUS FTA were taken by the Korean officials, on February 3rd, 2006, the US 
Senate announced the beginning of KoRUS FTA deliberations.
In reality, the February public hearing, which was held to satisfy the 
negotiation terms with the US, worked against the plans of anti-FTA 
organizations. They argued that there was not enough time before the public 
hearings to raise questions at the hearings and that, although the hearing was 
called to order, it wasn’t actually held. Thus, the negotiation announcement 
10 According to the former Trade Minister Hyun-Jong Kim (2006), “Some think that the 
US pressure to implement the KoRUS FTA has already taken effect. … However, the 
establishment of the KoRUS FTA is the fruit of our work of convincing the American 
administration, congress and businesses towards reform and opening.” The Ministry 
of Finance and Economy Serial (http://mofe.news.go.kr) [A Special Project ‘KoRUS 
FTA at the Start line’] March 14, 2006.
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itself should have been considered invalid, according to them.11 They also 
argued that because the “FTA Promotion Procedure Regulations” were a set 
of rules made with the promotion of KoRUS FTA in mind, and considering 
that the public hearing broke down, the whole situation should be seen as a 
breach of contract. criticisms of the government for not providing sufficient 
opportunities to collect opinions from the public ultimately led the Korean 
government to hold another public hearing on June 27th, 2006. However, this 
effort was not enough to calm the outbreak of the anti-FTA organizations and 
groups. 
Due to the expiration of the TPA, the US suggested that negotiations start 
from the beginning of that year. However, Korea and the US later agreed to 
start in June, after Korea held a regional election that was planned for the last 
day of May. Nonetheless, the unofficial negotiations between FTA personnel 
from both sides led to the inspection of some items on the agenda, which 
eventually cut much time off of the official schedule. 
The Korean officials were aware of the TPA expiration, yet they did not 
agree to any sort of negotiation time line. Nevertheless, it is true that the 
Korean officials admitted that it would be much easier to ratify the agreement 
if it were to be signed by both sides before the expiration of TPA. Therefore, 
both governments agreed to try their best to come to an agreement by the 
end of March of 2007 (the actual deadline was April 2, 2007). As a part of 
this small agreement, both sides also agreed to schedule a total of eight 
negotiation sessions and to utilize unofficial meetings to reduce the time as 
much as they possibly could. The number of scheduled negotiation sessions 
itself shows how much interest both governments had in the KoRUS FTA; 
for past FTAs, Korea scheduled only up to four such sessions per year, 
but in the case of the KoRUS FTA, there were negotiations almost every 
month. Furthermore, for every negotiation session, the officials set a five-
day structure, which doubled the days spent for negotiations in the past. In 
addition, many more people were involved in the KoRUS FTA negotiations 
11 According to the public hearing schedule, which generally lasts about two weeks, it 
seems that the government had a hard time trying to hold such a hearing. However, 
considering the sensitivity of the KoRUS FTA and its importance, the government 
should have held the hearing even if it took the delaying of the announcement of the 
start of the negotiation.
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compared to those of other FTAs. 
Despite the eight negotiations held until March of 2007, both sides failed 
to close the gaps on a majority of the issues in the KoRUS FTA. Mainly, these 
issues were related to automobiles, textiles, and agriculture. In attempts to 
reach an agreement, telephone negotiations were conducted between the 
heads of the two states in March, with multiple high-level-official negotiations 
thereafter. Thanks to these efforts, negotiations miraculously came to an end 
on April 2nd, 2007. However, the very next month, in May, the American 
administration and congress agreed on a new trade policy, which eventually 
led to additional negotiations. The final agreement was reached in late June, 
and the agreement was thus signed by both parties on the 30th of June. Soon 
after, the Korean government drafted a new set of domestic implementation 
laws, and in September, a letter requesting KoRUS FTA ratification was 
presented to congress. 
III. KoRUS FTA: MAIN coNTENTS
The KoRUS FTA is an all-inclusive, wide-open trade agreement. Thus, it is 
not easy to analyze every detail of it simply. To discuss the contents of the 
KoRUS FTA in a more efficient manner, I have divided its contents into 
broad sections. The first of these is the removal of the tariff wall; the second 
is customs; the third, government procurement; fourth is trade remedies; 
fifth, patent rights/trade policy liberalization; and finally, service industry 
investment. In analyzing each section, I will discuss the main issues as well 
as the pros and cons of the issues from the perspective of Korea. concerning 
the main issues, I will adjust the depth of the analysis based on the level of 
importance of each issue. 
1. Tariffs
Traditionally, tariffs have been the core of economic profit in any FTA. Thus, 
the economy usually takes the majority of the weight during the negotiations. 
It is generally known that FTA negotiations are conducted with economic 
analysis at their core. Tariffs become a type of primary indicator to the 
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members of the FTA, not only because they can be analyzed quantitatively, 
but also because they are relatively easy for the participating nations to 
cross-correlate. Tariffs are so closely related to other areas of the FTA that 
they ultimately determine how inclusive or open it will be; thus, there is a 
tendency for the whole structure to be designed and built toward the end of 
the negotiation process.
The level of tariff reduction in the KoRUS FTA is incomparable by both 
international and domestic standards. There are few international trade 
agreements that are as open as the KoRUS FTA. It is true that there are some 
international agreements, such as the cER (closer Economic Relations) 
of Australia and New Zealand and the US-chile FTA, in which tariffs are 
completely removed, but with the exception of those agreements, it is rare to 
find international trade agreements that eliminate all tariffs. In the KoRUS 
FTA, tariffs on textiles are completely eliminated. Tariffs on agricultural 
products, with the exception of rice, reached a 99.9% tariff reduction. 
In the case of the KoRUS FTA, Korea focused primarily on exceptions to 
the opening of its rice market, and the US focused primarily on entering the 
Korean market with its items of interest. Both nations agreed to eliminate 
Table 2. The Range of Tariff Reductions in Korean FTAs
Section Agreement Remarks
Announcement
chile (tariff concession of 99.8%: 100% for industrial products, 98.5% for agricultural products)
Singapore 2004 (tariff concession of 91.6%: 97.4% for industrial products, 66.6% for agricultural products)
EFTA 2006 (tariff concession of 98.5%: 99.7% for industrial products, 34~58% for agricultural products)
9 ASEAN 
nations
2007 (tariff concession of 99.1%: 100% for industrial 
products, 93.2% for agricultural products)
4 AFTA 
nations
2006 (preferential tariff rate of 14~35.7%: import tariff 
rate of 6.1~52.7%)
conclusion U.S. Tariff concession of 99.9%: 100% for industrial products, 99.9% for agricultural products
Note: AFTA (formerly ‘Bangkok Agreement’) is subject to not tariff elimination but tariff 
reduction.
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tariffs on almost all items, other than rice. For produce such as oranges, 
potatoes, grapes and other agricultural products, they agreed to apply a 
seasonal tariff so that the current tariffs would be maintained during specific 
circulation seasons and that tariffs would be eliminated during the seasons 
when the Korean market would not suffer any damage. With the exception of 
these items, it is true that tariffs on all agricultural products will be removed 
as a result of the KoRUS FTA. 





oranges, Soybeans, Potatoes, Skim and Whole Milk, 
condensed Milk, Natural Honey
Seasonal Tariff grapes, Potato chips
Long-term Elimination, 
Tri-Interval-Elimination
Apples (Fuji 20 years, others 10 years), Pears (Asian Pears 20 
years, others 10 years)
Long-term Elimination, 
Safeguard
Beef (15 Years), Pork (Frozen 10 Years), chiles, garlic, onions 
(15 Years), ginseng (18 Years), Barley (15 Years), Beer Malt 
and Malting Barley (15 Years), Starch (10~15 Years)
15 Years Walnut, chestnuts, Mandarins, Matsutake Mushrooms, Shitake Mushrooms, Filtered Tobacco
12 Years chicken (Frozen, Wings), Frozen onions, Watermelons, Subsidiary Feed
10 Years Peaches, Persimmons, Mandarin Juice, Tobacco Leaves, Plums
6~9 Years
Fresh Strawberries (9 Years), Beer, Ice cream, Apricots, 
Popcorn corn, Ice cream (7 Years), Pork (2014.1.1, etc.) 
Walnuts, High-Fructose corn Syrup (6 Years)
Within 5 Years
Peas, Potatoes (Frozen), Tomato Juice, orange Juice, Whiskey, 
Brandy (5 Years), Seafood (3 Years), Avocados, Lemons (2 
Years)
Immediate Elimination orange Juice (Frozen), Living Animals, Flowers, coffee, Wine, Mill, Field corn, Soybeans for oil, Almonds
Annotation: Numbers inside the parentheses represent the duration of the tariff elimina-
tion.
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 2007.
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In the case of the manufacturing industry, the majority of the products 
received 5 or more years to collect duty, whereas tariffs on the majority of 
agricultural products, which have a history of trade revenue, are subject 
to elimination systematically over five or more years. In addition, the 
manufacturing industry will face immediate tariff elimination on 84% of its 
products, and tariffs on the rest of the products will be eliminated within 
ten years of the implementation of the policy. The agricultural product 
concession negotiation was one of the most challenging points in the 
negotiation for both sides. Korea considered the sensitivity of the agriculture 
industry opening early on and therefore set the main goals of the concession 
negotiation as the following: first, secure as much exceptional treatment as 
possible; second, secure the longest possible policy implementation time 
frame for the agriculture industry. Approximately 10% of products, including 
rice, received an exceptional treatment or of at least 15 years of time before 
the complete elimination of the tariff (products with an average trade 
revenue of 25% or higher), but those that are relatively less sensitive were 
categorized for either immediate tariff elimination or for elimination over 10 
years. However, most of the agricultural products assigned to the category of 
immediate tariff elimination were those that do not critically affect or have 
no effect on the domestic market. The contents of the agriculture negotiations 
agreement clearly show the compromises of the two nations. These 
compromises included import quota (TQR) management and agricultural 
product safeguard methods.
Rice or rice-related products were completely eliminated from the list of 
items subject to tariff liberalization. For some of the items, i.e., those with 
either large external price differences or tariffs high enough that the tariff 
elimination is expected to have a critical impact on the economy, tariffs were 
maintained at their current levels. However, in consideration of the American 
position in the agriculture industry, Korea decided to allow import quotas on 
some products. Examples of these products are soybeans, potatoes, powdered 
milk, natural honey, and oranges. Seasonal tariffs were only to be applied 
to those products with a high level of sensitivity and those products that 
have distinct seasons of harvesting and distribution. This is meant to protect 
domestic products. Examples of these products are grapes (May-october 
15th), oranges (September-February), and potatoes for potato chips (May-
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November).
Furthermore, the parties introduced a tri-elimination of tariffs (elimination 
of tariffs in three intervals) to minimize the impact of the FTA opening. 
This is usually applied in cases in which the variety and use of the main 
products are specifically classified by the participating nations. When 
there were worries that American apples might replace Korean apples, the 
Korean government decided to eliminate tariffs on American Fuji apples 
within 20 years (a safeguard of 23 years). For products with a low level of 
import probability, the Korean government decided to eliminate tariffs 
within 10 years. In addition, American Asian pears or similar species were 
targeted for tariff elimination within 20 years, and tariffs on other species 
were to be eliminated within 10 years. Because potatoes and soybeans are 
highly competitive, the tariffs on edible potatoes and soybeans were to be 
maintained at their current levels, yet tariffs on potatoes and soybeans used 
for food processing were subject to immediate elimination to reflect the 
understanding between the producer and the consumer.  
According to the main item-by-item concessions, tariffs on beef (40%) are 
to be eliminated within 15 years, while tariffs on pork (22.5~25%) are to be 
eliminated by 2014. However, for frozen pork, which has a very high expected 
level of future imports, the tariffs are subject to elimination within 10 years. 
The tariffs for some items were kept at their current levels in exchange for 
import quotas. For instance, tariffs on natural honey (243%) were kept at 
their current levels, but an import quota (200 tons with a 3% annual increase) 
was set. Skim milk, dry whole milk (176%), and condensed milk (89%) are 
also to be increased by 3% annually from the initial 5,000 tons.
given the nature of the American agriculture industry, there are few 
vegetable imports, but considering how much they contribute to agriculture 
income, Korea adopted conservative concessions. Among the vegetable and 
special produce items, sesame seeds, sesame oil (630%), chili peppers (270%), 
garlic (360%), onions (135%), ginger (377.3%), and peanuts (230.5%) were 
subject to tariff elimination within 15 years. To compete against American 
ginseng, fresh ginseng, white ginseng, red ginseng, and seven other items 
from the ginseng (222.8~754.3%) category, were subject to tariff elimination 
within 18 years. Among fruits, mandarin oranges (144%) and kiwis (45%) 
were subject to tariff elimination within 15 years, while peaches, sweet 
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persimmons (45%), and persimmons (50%) were subject to tariff elimination 
within 10 years. Tariffs on barley, malting barley, and malt were to be 
eliminated within 15 years, and unhulled barley (324%), rye (299.7%), malt 
(269%), and malting barley (513%) were to be granted import quotas. 
All tariffs on the manufacturing industry are to be eliminated immediately; 
items that make up approximately 94% of the standard amount of imports 
were set for early elimination (within 3 years). owing to this, both nations 
have high hopes of increasing actual trade rates. According to documents 





Automobiles (8), Auto Parts (3~8), 
Xylene (5), Fiber-optic cables (8), 
Jet Engines (3), Airbags (8), Back 
Mirrors (8), Digital Projection TVs 
(8), etc.
>3,000cc Automobiles (2.5), Auto 
Parts (1.3~10.2), LcD Monitors (5), 
camcorders (2.1), Precious Metal 
Jewelry (5.5), Polystyrene (6.5), 
color TVs (5), Shoes (8.5), Light 
bulbs (2.6), Electric Amplifiers (4.9)
3 Years Element(6.5), Silicon oil (6.5), 
Polyurethane (6.5), Toothpaste (8), 
Fragrances (8), golf clubs (8), etc.
DTVs (5), <3,000cc Automobiles 
(2.5), color TVs (5), golf Products 
(4.9), chandeliers (3.9), etc.
5 Years Radio amplifiers (8), Aluminum 
Boards (8), Safe Razors (8), Patient 
Monitors (8), Razors (8), Detergent 
(6.5), Hair conditioner (8), Lobsters 
(20), etc.
Tires (4), Leatherwear(6), Polyether 
(6.5), Speakers (4.9), etc.
10 Years Basic Makeup (8), Phenol (5.5), 
Ultrasound Imaging Devices (8), 
Ball Bearings (13), contact Lenses 
(8), etc.
Microwaves (2), Washing Machines 
(1.4), Polyester Resin (6.5), Imitation 
Jewelry (11), Bearings (9), Textile 
Dryers (3.4), Trucks (25), etc.
10 Years, 
Non-linear
Particle Boards (8), Textile Boards 
(8), Plywood (12), etc.





Footnote: (#) represents the tariff %.
Source: The Korean government (2007).
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the signing of the KoRUS FTA, Korean-made products are expected to enter 
the overseas market. Some products that benefit the most from the short-
term tariff elimination and that are expected to increase in market share are 
Korean automobiles, LcD monitors, camcorders, TVs, cameras, audio amps, 
polystyrene, metal cutting manufacturing machinery, earphones, epoxy resin, 
and color TVs. 
Some items were subject to tariff eliminations over 5 years or more, and 
in case of the US, these items were tires (4), aluminum foil (5.8), glue (2.1), 
leather wear (6), silicon ferromanganese (3.9), polyether (6.5), polystyrene 
(6.5), safety glasses (4.9), speakers (4.9), bicycles (11), and others. Those 
items that were subject to tariff elimination within 10 years were microwaves 
(2), washing machines (1.4), polyester resin (6.5), bearings (9), ABS resin 
(6.5), vinyl tile covers (5.3), air conditioners (2.2), paint (6.6), textile dryers 
(3.4), dish washers (2.4), electric blenders (4.2), imitation jewelry (11), metal 
tableware (14), glass goods (5.0~38), and trucks (25).
Korea assigned the following items for tariff elimination within 5 
years: radio amplifiers (8), aluminum boards (8), safety razors (8), patient 
monitoring systems (8), razors (8), detergents (6.5), < 3-ton forklifts (8), 
hair conditioner (8), and dental scalers (8). The items assigned for 10 years 
are acrylic nitrile (6.5), basic makeup (8), phenol (5.5), ultrasound imaging 
devices (8), MRI scanners (8), ball bearings (13), polyethylene (6.5), complex 
amplifiers (8), acetone (5.5), safety valves (8), endoscopes (8), and latex (8). 
2. Trade System Areas
a. Customs Clearance Procedures
American non-tariff barriers are generally low. However, after the September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the US implemented the cSI (container Security 
Initiative), which slowed the customs process. It is true that similar initiatives 
may be implemented in the future, which could significantly slow the 
process of importing and exporting, ultimately inflating the distribution 
cost. Nonetheless, through the KoRUS FTA, both parties have agreed to 
initiate a system oriented toward minimizing the distribution costs at all 
times. According to KoTRA’s (Korean Trade-Investment Promotion Agency) 
publication in early 2008, entitled “Present conditions of the Major Export 
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Markets’ Non-Tariff Barriers,” the customs clearance process is by far the 
greatest obstacle that Korean firms face in exports. 
To expedite and smooth the process of trade between the parties, each 
member state must either adopt or maintain an effective customs-clearance 
procedure. Also, they must consider a system that allows transport of goods 
within 48 hours of arrival. In the KoRUS FTA, to expedite the transport 
of goods, all information about the goods is to be submitted and processed 
electronically. In addition, the KoRUS FTA implements a system that allows 
exporters to transport goods out of the customs house before the authorities 
finalize the decisions on matters such as applicable tariffs and processing 
fees.12
To expedite and automate customs clearance procedures, the involved 
parties must develop a compatible electronic system and must adopt or 
maintain an automated risk management system. To smooth the trade system 
for both parties, each member state must improve its risk management 
techniques, smooth its international distribution net standards, simplify 
procedures for efficient and timely trade, improve employees’ techniques, 
and provide technical support and consultation to the participating party 
to improve or enhance the applied technology. A member state must issue a 
pre-evaluation within 90 days after its customs officials submit a request, and 
a requester must submit a copy of all information, including samples of the 
goods, requested by the member state.
b. Government Procurement
By 2005 standards, it is estimated that the size of the American procurement 
market totals approximately 1 trillion dollars. The South Korean Ministry 
of Finance and Economy determines that as a result of the KoRUS FTA, US 
Federal government procurement will increase to 6 trillion won. Thus far, 
Korean firms’ participation in the American procurement market has been 
extremely limited. According to 2005 standards, Korean firms only acquired 
$9.4 billion dollars, which is only 0.25% of the total US federal government 
procurement. This is lower than the participation of germany, England, 
12 A member state may request sufficient collateral, a deposit or other means of 
guarantee regarding domestic tariffs or commission fees on imports.
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Japan, canada, and others. Additionally, most of the 9.4 billion dollars came 
from distributions to the US Armed Forces in Korea. Explanations for this 
are Korean firms’ lack of information on procurement markets and the highly 
complicated procedures that are involved. 
According to a 2007 report by South Korea’s Small & Medium Business 
Administration,13 general Service Administration (gSA) schedule submission 
and other complicated requirements and qualification standards, such as 
Multiple Award Supply (MAS), have been the barriers that have kept Korean 
firms from participating. The report revealed that Korean firms’ hardships 
in finding a prime contractor, local consultants, and agents, as well as details 
related to bids and paperwork were the greatest problems faced. Also, although 
it is true that defense procurement, by 2005 standards, totaled 70% of the US 
federal government procurement market, due to separate defense procurement 
agreements, evaluation programs and other complicated measures remained 
as the de facto barrier that prevented Korean firms from further participation. 
Korea’s Small & Medium Business Administration estimates that because 
foreign procurement markets, including that of the US, are increasing, South 
Korean small- and medium-sized businesses can enter foreign markets much 
more easily through the KoRUS FTA. In the actual words of the agreement, 
in chapter 17, which deals with government procurement, it states that first, 
member states have agreed to the expansion of the bilateral procurement 
market and have agreed on cooperation in other procurement-related 
international affairs with APEc and others. This portion (chapter 17) of 
the KoRUS FTA must not be understood as a means of evading the WTo’s 
government procurement code, and it applies to all actions regarding eligible 
procurements. 
Both Korea and the US have agreed to reduce their federal government 
products and service thresholds from 2 billion to 1 billion won for Korea, 
and for the US, from 200,000 dollars to 100,000 dollars. This definitely 
opened the procurement market more widely for both parties. The US 
decided to maintain the WTo government procurement code at the state 
13 The Small and Medium Business Administration, “The Land of opportunities for the 
Medium Size Industries, Aim for the offshore Procurement Market,” government 
Briefing,  August 20, 2007.
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level; thus, to counter this, South Korea agreed to exclude not only local 
governments but also public enterprises. However, despite the exclusion of 
local governments and public enterprises in the KoRUS FTA, according to 
the WTo government procurement code, in 37 American states and 6 public 
enterprises, the procurement market has already been opened. 
c. Trade Liberalization
The trade liberalization part of the KoRUS FTA is broadly divided into two 
parts, anti-dumping/countervailing duties and global safeguards/bilateral 
safeguards. In the anti-dumping/countervailing duty section, the parties 
agreed to the vitalization of prices and supply sums, advanced notices, and 
the procurement of other agreement duties. They also agreed to install a trade 
liberalization committee, as a means of mediating communication between 
the participants. 
While presenting the need to promote the KoRUS FTA, there was an 
overwhelming amount of discussion concerning the need to develop a plan 
to prevent abuse of anti-dumping lawsuits. Anti-dumping lawsuits are a 
WTo-recognized trade liberalization policy, and recently, more nations are 
paying closer attention to investigations of anti-dumping (4 nations (1980) 
→ 18 nations (1995) → 24 nations (2003)). According to Korea’s Ministry of 
Knowledge Economy, previously the Ministry of commerce, Industry and 
Energy, among these nations, the US has the most anti-dumping lawsuits, 
followed by china and South Korea, respectively.14
The effects of anti-dumping actions on trade have been verified in 
numerous studies, such as Prusa (1997, 2001) and Brenton (2001). According 
to Park (2006), Prusa (2001) focused on US-led anti-dumping efforts between 
14 As shown in the chart below, Korea is sued more than it sues others.
Anti-Dumping Litigation Actions, Korea
’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 ’00 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04 Total
Sue 4 13 15 3 6 2 4 9 18 3 77
Sued 14 11 15 24 34 22 23 23 17 24 207
 Source: Ministry of commerce, Industry and Energy Trade committee, The Trade 
Environment in Recent Years and the Trade Remedy System, November, 2005.
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1980 and 1994, specifically on its income, with the conclusion that after 
one year, the corresponding nations’ imports decreased by about 55% while 
that of the nations acquitted on charges decreased by 33%. Even if some 
arrangements are made, it is a common trend that the nation experiences a 
decline in imports by about 40% or more.15
on a closer examination of trade liberalization, one will find that once 
exporters or the home authorities offer a price or a quantity settlement, 
American authorities consider this to be an adequate opportunity for an 
agreement. once the parties agree upon a price or quantity, the investigations 
of anti-dumping and of the countervailing duties are finalized. 
currently, the US is going through approximately 300 anti-dumping 
investigations. of the 300 anti-dumping cases, the US has reached an 
agreement on only 6 of them, which shows that it rarely considers price 
or quantity settlement agreements as a means to reach a settlement. The 
KoRUS FTA offers many more opportunities for such agreements between 
the US and Korea. Price increases are determined within the boundaries of 
the anti-dumping duties; thus, exporters can expect a price increase to be a 
gain for them. Furthermore, the Trade Liberalization committee will oversee 
and inspect the agreement periodically to guarantee its effectiveness and 
rightfulness. 
In the agreement, the possibility of granting exemptions to subjects of 
global safeguards has been reflected as well. Regarding the implementation 
of global safeguards, if the partnering nation isn’t experiencing overly 
burdensome damage to its exports, it will be exempt from global safeguards. 
For example, if the imports coming into Korea are not significantly greater 
than that of NAFTA nations, or if Korean exports are inflicting minimal 
damages, it is expected that South Korea will be exempt from global 
safeguards. 
As for Korea being exempt from the global safeguards, South Korea can 
expect to find itself on the higher end of export numbers. Foreign market 
15 Meanwhile, Korea experienced quite an economic impact due to the Korea Trade 
commission (2005) Anti-Dumping verdict. The Korea Trade commission reports 
that due to the imposition of an anti-dumping tariff on chinese and Japanese batteries 
in 2000, the corresponding domestic industry performed twice as well in the following 
three years.
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shares may also increase. However, if this is not the case, then the US has 
no obligation to take any action, which implies that the effectiveness will be 
highly variable. 
Also, through the KoRUS FTA, Korea gained a channel to counter 
problems from stages of prior notices or agreement obligations on anti-
dumping investigations. Both parties, once an anti-dumping investigation 
is requested, must notify each other and provide simultaneous or similar 
opportunities for future agreements. The WTo agreement only states that 
parties be notified prior to the investigation; however, the KoRUS FTA 
actually seeks to make it an obligation for the parties to take proper action. 
In this case, the authorities can actively summon organizations or 
companies to counter effectively American corporations’ request for anti-
dumping investigations and their initiation. It is important that anti-dumping 
investigations not begin immediately after a request, as the start of an anti-
dumping investigation marks the decrease in sales for both suing and sued 
parties. That is, prior negotiations or agreements provide the suppression 
of indiscreet anti-dumping lawsuits and room for authorities to conduct 
a thorough analysis of the validity of the submitted documents for the 
lawsuits, which ultimately saves both time and money for Korean exporting 
companies.
d. Intellectual Property
It is undeniable that intangible assets such as technology and knowledge 
are increasingly becoming influential factors in determining a nation’s 
place in terms of international competition. An economic transformation 
to a knowledge-based economy is rapidly in progress, and many developed 
nations, such as the US and Japan, generate more than 50% of their total 
added value from knowledge. Just as futurologist Peter Drucker suggested, 
the 21st century will be made up of knowledge-based societies, in which 
knowledge and information have become the core essence of personal and 
national competitiveness. By 2006 standards, Korea is the fourth-largest 
industrial and intellectual property-rights nation, following china, the 
US, and Japan, respectively. However, the Korea’s quality of evaluation and 
judgment are relatively low compared to that of the other developed nations. 
Also, the South Korean level of research products and its intellectual property 
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security and related practical application are very low. South Korea needs 
to upgrade its protection of intellectual property and to utilize developed 
technologies for economic profit generation by commercializing patent 
technology and technology trade. Intellectual property protection in a world 
of knowledge-based economies is the key infrastructure to maintaining 
national competitiveness and technical innovation; however, due to its failure 
to control counterfeit goods, Korea is experiencing difficulties in keeping a 
healthy sovereign credit rating.16
While it is true that the intellectual property part of the KoRUS FTA 
may pressure the Korean economy to some degree, it is generally judged 
to strengthen Korean policy and enhance its intellectual property. First, 
the copyright protection period has been extended from 50 years to 70 
years following the death of the owner, with the condition that a two-year 
grace period be provided. The parties agreed that patent registrations are 
unreasonably delayed, and they agreed to implement a legal compensatory 
damage policy for copyright and trademark rights violations, which sets 
a lower limit on compensation for damages ahead of time. In the KoRUS 
FTA, the parties agreed to acknowledge ‘transient reproduction rights’, yet 
exemptions were to be placed for its application in the public interest, such as 
education and research with the stipulation of ‘access control technological 
restraint for protection’. They also agreed to extend the lifespan of patents that 
experience an unreasonable delay of their patent registration. This agenda 
generally reflects the US position. The agenda that reflected the Korean 
position was the item on non-violation complaints and its application to 
intellectual property, which was delayed until further WTo decisions are 
made. 
The system that extends the lifespan of patents that were subjects of 
unreasonable delays can find its roots from the rule that sets the standard 
application period to the time after 4 years from the date of application 
or 3 years from the date of the appeal for a review. This system seeks to 
standardize the Korean patent evaluation process and registration period. 
16 This is paraphrased from the Korean Intellectual Property office’s “2007 White Paper 
on Intellectual Property,” pages 5-17.
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According to the Korean Intellectual Property office (2007)17 (the 
Patent and Trademark office), The KoRUS FTA industrial property rights 
negotiation process minimizes its effect on the South Korean economy 
while serving as a base that enhances its industrial property rights system. 
originally, many speculated that the field of industrial property rights or 
other intellectual property rights would reflect mainly the American position. 
In fact, the US has thus far been proposing its version of standard templates 
in the previous FTAs into which it has entered, which shows the very one-
sided nature forced by the US. 
American brands were generally embraced concerning trademark rights 
as well. First, the parties agreed to eliminate the recordation demands on 
the American trademark exclusive right-to-use due to the criticism that the 
trademark users’ rights cannot be protected adequately when exclusive rights 
are nullified when an application for trademark exclusive use rights is not 
submitted to the Patent and Trademark office. In addition, the recent trend 
of international usage rights and registration qualification issues, with its 
consideration of a trademark as property to be used freely at the will of the 
right holder, also facilitated the agreement.
A certification mark system was introduced. A certification mark is a mark 
used to certify the quality of the goods or service provided. It was introduced 
after considering the positive aspect of the system that seeks to strengthen 
quality certification functions. This is expected to vitalize the already in-
use certification mark systems at various levels of government and private 
organizations, which will ultimately cut costs and spending. 
Sound and scent trademarks were also accepted. International smell/
scent trademark protection trends and an increasing number of trademark 
protection subjects were all considered as positive before the introduction of 
such a system. South Korean trademark law limits trademarks to something 
that must be visible; thus, invisible trademarks such as sound and scent have 
not been subject to protection, which suggests changes in the Korean code 
in the future. According to the Korean Intellectual Property office, sound 
and scent trademarks are already being accepted not only in the US, but also 
17 The Korean Intellectual Property office, “KoRUS FTA, Industrial Intellectual 
Property Rights Negotiation Results,” Korean International cooperation Team, 2007.
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in Europe and Australia. Therefore, South Korea also took the initiative to 
modify its code to accept invisible trademarks as well. 
3. System Improvement
Much of the KoRUS FTA content pertains to how South Korea can enhance 
its economic system. The KoRUS FTA will serve as a crucial cornerstone in 
implementing enhanced and developed systems, and modifications of law 
codes to accommodate them will not only make South Korean systems more 
transparent, but also more fair. Among the many areas in which the KoRUS 
FTA is expected to have the greatest impact are automobiles, medical supplies, 
technological barriers, consent order systems, competition, intellectual 
properties, labor, and the environment. Strengthening competitiveness 
by opening these industries along with enhancing the current system will 
maximize the effects of the KoRUS FTA. 
<Table 5> shows Korean laws that must be altered once the KoRUS FTA 
is in effect. As shown in the table, two automobile laws must change, and 
the administrative procedure law must be altered to extend the legislation 
notification period. once technological standardization occurs, more laws 
must be changed to increase public participation for transparency, fair trade, 
and to protect investors with the Investor-State Dispute (ISD) clause. 
Such contents, in detail, show that in a situation in which a trading party 
submits a corrective measure which is in violation of the law to the FTc, 
especially regarding cases which take a rather long time for a decision to be 
reached, the FTc may take administrative actions without having to take 
additional measures in order to expedite the conclusion of the case, only 
if the case has a high degree of validity, i.e., a policy that acknowledges an 
arrangement between a state and the corresponding party or an individual.
A review of this system has been pending by the Korean FTc, the Ministry 
of Finance and Economy, and the Ministry of commerce, Industry, and 
Energy since 2005. However, due to opposition from the Ministry of Justice, 
it has failed to make further progress. This system relieves pressure from 
corporations’ it has already been adopted by the US, the EU, germany, Japan, 
and other developed nations. 
Procedural transparency related to telecommunications standards 
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Table 5. Expected changes in South Korean Law Following the Implementation of the 
KoRUS FTA
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tion on unfair trade 
acts and industrial 
damage relief







- Acknowledging Information Technology 
certification by American Institutions 
- Develop grounds to Authorize Low-Rank 
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- Authorize Medicine and Medical Supplies 





Regulations and Fair 
Trade Law
- Implement a system in which, in case an 
illegitimate party submits corrective mea-
sures in violation of the law, the FTc is not 
obligated to take additional actions, such as 
corrections and victim liberalization actions, 
but should immediately proceed to take ad-
ministrative measures
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selections was strengthened as well. During the negotiations, the Korean 
government placed emphasis on government-led technological standardization. 
However, the US opposed this idea for the reason that such action is a 
non-market-like measure. Therefore, the two nations agreed to strengthen 
transparency once the technological standardization decisions are made. This 
was meant to improve technological efficiency; if there is a common goal to 
be accomplished by both governments, the government is to maintain the 
right to promote a technological standardization policy. In addition, as a 
means to improve telecommunication transparency, the two governments 
guaranteed equal participation for all players in the market in the area 
of frequency assignments and the distribution of public communication 
services. 
To improve medical price transparency and fairness, the two governments 
agreed to publish medicine and medical supply-related policies. The parties 
must publish all laws or policies concerning medicine and medical supply-
related wages and prices prior to making final decisions, and those parties 
concerned are granted more opportunities to express opinions. Additionally, 
the two nations decided to implement an independent appeals system to 
accommodate the need to raise faults and problems concerning prices and 
wages pertaining to medicine and medical supplies. 
The two nations agreed to improve the business practices of the medicine 
and medical supply industry by making it illegal for them to provide unfair 
gifts. To accommodate this, they agreed to implement appropriate policies 
and rules. They also agreed to improve other business practices such as 
eliminating rebates related to purchasing medicine and medical supplies.
In the labor area, a Public communication System was introduced. This 
system makes a member state file requests, opinions, and complaints in 
case a labor-related law is broken.18 once a public opinion is submitted, the 
authorities must release information on the issue and on the investigation 
and results that come later. With this system introduced, the two nations have 
18 Similar rules apply to violations of the environment. That is, a concerned person can 
request an investigation by the corresponding state on a case involving environmental 
law violations, and that state guarantees punishment procedures and relief for the 
concerned person.  
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created an opportunity to cooperate with the public as well as other civic 
organizations and thus strengthen the transparency of all processes.
4. Service, Investment
a. Service
All services are subject to service agreements, except gambling services, 
financial services, air traffic services, government procurement actions, 
government supplements, and government provision services. The partnering 
service providers are charged with four general obligations, which are limited 
to National Treatment (NT), Most Favored Nation (MFN), Market Access 
(MA), and a Local Presence (LP) duty imposed ban. However, if one wishes 
to not conform to these obligations, the obligation may be deferred according 
to the Non-conforming Measure clause.19
During deferments due to range-related negotiations, the problem of local 
government measures becomes important. The American state government 
incongruent system is posted currently as Annex I, in which the parties 
agreed to apply a ratchet mechanism. However, considering the technological 
hardship this would entail for the US, in return for listing all state government 
incongruent systems, a non-confining prefiguring list was applied. Moreover, 
in the case of a home investor or service provider entering the American 
market and thus facing a specific hardship concerning a state government 
incongruent system, a negotiation channel was established to exchange 
information and to discuss such matters further. Such channels are to be 
applied not only to the service industry, but also to non-service industries as 
well, such as the mining industry, manufacturing industry, and the agriculture 
and fisheries industry. Meanwhile, all of the local governments, including the 
Korean provincial governments and American county governments, were 
permitted to not abide by the four general obligations. 
19 Methods to postpone this are as follows: Annex I (Immediate Postponement) and 
Annex II (Future Postponement). Annex I is a list of existing actions that do not 
coincide with negotiation duties. A ratchet mechanism is applied here. For example, 
if current limits put on foreign investments are 30% and if the limit is lowered to 
20% or increased to 40%, it cannot return to 30% once adjusted. Annex II (Future 
Postponement) is a list of areas subject to change or to maintain.
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In the case of the financial sector, considering that the South Korean 
financial service market was opened on a commercial basis, the KoRUS 
FTA talks on the finance industry were mainly concerned with the bilateral 
opening of the service and of new financial industries. The two parties agreed 
to allow four types of insurance brokerages: reinsurance, flight insurance, 
export and import cargo insurance, and marine insurance. In the case of 
credit rating agencies, no bilateral trade was allowed, but in the case of a 
foreign firm entering a home market, the entering qualification standards 
were lowered. For new financial products, only case-by-case openings 
were allowed due to their highly risky nature; thus, those products with 
exceptionally high risk, such as retail finance products, were removed from 
the list allowed products. Additionally, a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was signed to accommodate the expansion of bilateral trade and 
allow new financial service products. Korea defended the American request 
to end government support for national policy financial institutions (Korea 
Development Bank, Industry Bank, Korea Finance corporation, National 
Agricultural cooperative Federation, and the Fisheries cooperative 
Association). Also, the two parties agreed to acknowledge the distinct 
characteristics of the post office and other public institutions and yet 
strengthen their financial supervision to minimize any potential weakness 
which may arise in the future. 
Furthermore, Korean professional services (legal, accounting, and tax) 
are to be gradually opened. Three stages were set for legal services, in which 
an American law practitioner with a valid bar license can provide legal 
consultation about American laws in Korea. In a similar manner, two stages 
were set for accounting and tax services. 
Korean broadcast services will be partially opened as well. The approval 
system, foreigner share limits, and screen quotas on ground-wave, cable 
broadcast, and System operators (Sos) were to be kept at the current standing. 
However, some parts surrounding the Program Provider (PP) were partially 
liberalized. Foreign investment in home PP is to be kept at a maximum 
of 49%, whereas domestic corporations may hold anywhere from 50% to 
100% of ownership (within three years of the agreement taking effect). 
However, reports, coverage, general services, and home shopping categories 
were subjected to exemption. concerning the screen quota, regulations on 
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those domestic programs that apply to PP and others were eased. once the 
agreement takes effect, the movie sector will drop its quota from 25% to 
20%, and for animations from 35% to 30%. Screen quotas on ground-wave 
broadcasts are to be kept at the current status. Single-country quotas are to be 
adjusted from 60% to 80%. The concept of a single-country quota refers to a 
policy that limits programs from a certain country from occupying a specific 
percentage of the total number of foreign programs in play. The easing of 
single-country quotas is also applied to ground-wave, cable, and So. other 
than these issues, resolutions of issues related to broadcast services were 
postponed (Appendix II). 
b. Investment
Investment agreements are largely composed of 1) obligations of the state 
attracting foreign investments to protect foreign investors’ rights and 
obligation exemptions, and 2) Investor-State Disputes (ISDs). The investment 
part of the KoRUS FTA does not apply to cases or activities that occurred 
before the agreement takes effect. It applies to central, local and provincial 
governments and to other Ngos that have been authorized by the state. 
concerning the issue of expropriation and compensation, the South 
Korean government allows this for the following: 1) for public purposes, 
2) with non-discriminatory measures, and 3) for investors’ assets to 
be nationalized via legal routes, but only with accommodating rapid, 
appropriate, and effective compensation that reflects the fair market value. 
Additionally, the policy sets a rule to compensate appropriately those 
damaged by indirect accommodation, which is equivalent to a violation of 
property rights. “Indirect accommodation” refers to a situation in which the 
value of an investment becomes equivalent to that of direct accommodation 
due to special government measures which prohibits an investor from 
actually conducting business. generally, the issue of indirect accommodation 
is included not only in the KoRUS FTA but in all of the other FTAs and other 
major investment agreements around the world.
ISD procedures state that in case an investor experiences a loss due to 
the investment-attracting state regulations or characteristics, the investor 
is granted power to file a lawsuit against the state. During this process, the 
investor may request international arbitration. International arbitration is 
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overseen by a three-person tribunal, and both the investor and the state may 
assign one person each and then appoint an arbitrator chairperson. If such a 
tribunal is not organized within 75 days of the lawsuit, the secretary general 
of the International centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (IcSID) 
may appoint a third party as the arbitrator chairperson, who must have a 
different nationality than both of the litigating parties. An investor cannot file 
a lawsuit three years after a loss incurred due to the state.
IV. EcoNoMIc EFFEcTS oF THE KoRUS FTA
Many institutions and individuals have evaluated the KoRUS FTA negotiations 
and, generally, they have returned positive analyses. Both Korean and 
American authorities used quantitative analysis to present an economic 
examination, and major Korean political parties, such as the grand National 
Party and the open Uri Party, published similar results. The majority of 
studies conducted on the economic effects of the KoRUS FTA evaluate its 
economic effects very highly; however, the Democratic Labor Party of Korea, 
the Korean Alliance against the KoRUS FTA, and other organizations gave a 
rather negative evaluation.
There are two distinct methods used to analyze the KoRUS FTA: 
quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative method is widely used in recent 
FTA economic analyses in which macroeconomic tools, such as gDP, exports, 
and industrial production, are used. This method presents the main contents 
of the FTA in a quantitative manner; thus, it has the benefit of being able 
to emphasize the appropriateness of the agreement. However, only a small 
portion of the FTA is actually included in the quantitative analysis, giving 
rise to problems and lending validity to the criticism of underestimation. 
criticism following the negotiations targets the methods used to estimate the 
economic impact of the KoRUS FTA, but such criticism can be explained 
simply as the contradicting views of different perspectives. Meanwhile, 
the qualitative method has the downside of not containing quantitative 
estimations, but it does have the benefit of being able to analyze the overall 
content of the agreement and its characteristics from the perspectives of 
specific industries or citizen groups. 
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1. CGE Quantitative Analysis
The computable general Equilibrium (cgE) model, which is widely used to 
assess the economic impacts of FTAs, can take a variety of forms depending 
on the purpose of the researcher. However, the model used most commonly at 
present is the gTAP model, produced and developed by Purdue University.20 
The Purdue gTAP secretariat developed the ordinary general equilibrium 
model, and expanded it to the world trade level; thus, the gTAP model allows 
production, consumption, price and other major economic factors to interact 
which each other, which ultimately determines the final balance. 
generally, the cgE models function to assess the neoclassical school’s 
economic principles of producer’s cost minimization and consumer’s utility 
maximization. It generally assumes perfect competition. It is, however, true 
that the models ease the market clearing conditions and allow imperfect 
competition depending on the purpose of the researchers. 
Studies that assessed the economic impact of the KoRUS FTA include 
those from KIEP (2006, 2007), USITc (2007), the Democratic Labor Party of 
Korea (DLP), cheong (2006), Ko (2007) and others. This paper analyzes the 
controversial studies conducted by KIEP and the DLP. Also, this paper will 
present the results of the USITc study as a reference. The results of the KIEP 
and the DLP studies vary greatly, however, and depending on the range of the 
assessment, both results can be estimated.21
a. KIEP Estimates
The KIEP study, which used the cgE model, was presented in seminars held 
in March of 2006 and April of 2006. Published in 2007, it based its study 
on the actual contents of the KoRUS FTA negotiations. Hence, the study 
assumed the complete elimination of the manufacturing industry (with the 
exception of the chemical industry at 97% tax elimination), grains at 94%, 
20 Refer to http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/about the gTAP Model.
21 Some groups claimed that KIEP’s KoRUS FTA Economic Impact final figures were 
fixed; however, if one uses the KIEP methods and procedures, s/he can see identical 
results. In fact, Korea congress-led economic analysis conducted on october 29, 
2007, has been validated by academia.
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vegetables and fruits at 39%, and meat and dairy at 46%. Also, this study 
calculated the deregulation of the service sector as its tariff equivalent.
KIEP used three methods to derive their results. First, it used the 
standing basic gTAP model (referred to as the short-term stationary effect 
in Table 6). Second, it supplemented the accumulation of capital onto the 
basic model. Third, it supplemented the growth of production assumptions 
onto the accumulation of capital model. generally, the first model is used 
to derive the effects of tariff elimination, and the growth of production 
factor was used to estimate a variety of other economic effects of the FTA 
apart from tariff eliminations. The DLP and the Korean Alliance against the 
KoRUS FTA have continuously raised issues about the model that used the 
growth of production factor. The two argue that KIEP, in order to exaggerate 
the economic impact, externally reflected manufacturing production 
assumptions, which ultimately resulted in an estimation of a 7.75% increase 
in gDP.22
In 2006, before the negotiations, the KIEP studies reveal that the 
economic impact of the KoRUS FTA with a short-term stationary effect at 
0.42%, with the accumulation of capital estimated at 1.99%, and with both 
22 The KIEP research team assumed that the KoRUS FTA will improve the industrial 
production rate by 1.0-1.2%.
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the accumulation of capital and productivity estimated at 7.75%. However, in 
their 2007 report, the results were readjusted to show that the gDP increased, 
in the short term, by 0.32%. With productivity considered, the Korea gDP 
ultimately increased by 5.97%. The 2007 results were lowered because the 
KIEP study considered the negotiation factors in their studies. 
b. DLP Estimation
Figures from the Democratic Labor Party’s (DLP) “Assessment of the KoRUS 
FTA’s Impact on Economy and Legal Systems,” which was composed after the 
settlement of the KoRUS FTA, are based on the industrial tariff reductions 
discussed and settled during the negotiations.23 That is, in scenario 1, it 
was assumed that tariffs on agriculture products, with the exception of rice, 
would be reduced between 60-80% and that rice was exempt from tariff 
liberalization policies. Manufacturing and industrial tariffs were assumed to 
be eliminated, but textile tariffs were assumed to be reduced by only 20%, 
considering the application of the yarn-forward standards. In scenario 2, 
tariffs on all agricultural products, with the exception of rice, were assumed 
to be eliminated.
The gTAP basic model and the accumulation of capital model were used 
in the DLP assessment. Unlike the KIEP assessment, the DLP assessment did 
not assume a productivity increase. In its version of scenario 1, with the basic 
model, the Korea gDP showed a 0.22% increase; with the accumulation of 
capital model, the gDP showed a 0.71% increase. In scenario 2, which rice 
excluded, similar increases in gDP were shown. However, the figures showed 
23 The DLP Study was headed by Bum-cheol Shin, a Kyunggi University professor, and 
others.
Table 7. Economic Effects of the KoRUS FTA in the Democratic Labor Party’s Study 
Section (on an 
incremental basis)









Real gDP 0.22%(KRW 1.0 trillion) 0.71%
0.28%
(KRW 1.2 trillion) 0.87%
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a partial increase from that of scenario 1, which was 0.28% with the basic 
model and 0.87% with the accumulation of capital model.
c. USITC Report
on September 20, 2007, the United States International Trade commission 
(USITc) released its “Review of the KoRUS FTA.”24 According to its Trade 
Act of 2002, Section 2104(f), the US President must provide the detailed 
contents of the USITc negotiations within 90 days of signing the trade 
agreement, and the USITc, within 90 days of signing, must report an 
economic review of the agreement to the President and the congress. The 
USITc report assumed the complete liberalization of tariffs in all industries, 
including the agriculture industry, and its figures showed an approximate 
increase of 0.1% of gDP, which would be the equivalent of 10.1-11.9 billion 
dollars. 
The USITc report also expects $9.7-$10.9 billion dollars in increased 
trade with South Korea, also expecting that Korean income will increase by 
6.4-6.9 billion dollars, which will improve the Korean trade balance by 3.3-
4.0 billion dollars. The USITc expects American exports of dairy, meat, 
and clothing products to increase and expects extra exports of machinery, 
chemical, rubber, plastic, beef, and other foodstuffs will be more profitable. 
If the KoRUS FTA is to go in effect, the USITc expects an increased 
imports of textiles, clothing, leather goods, and shoes from Korea, with a 
steady increase in electronic goods and automobile imports. 
Effects of the KoRUS FTA on the US agriculture industry are expected 
generally to increase due to reductions or eliminations of the Korea’s high 
tariffs and trade-rate quotas. The USITc expects increased exports of grain, 
livestock feeds, fruits, dairy products, processed foods, meat, and seafood. 
However, it only expects limited effects on agriculture industry employment 
and production considering the Korea’s small market. Nonetheless, trade 
in electronics, machinery, transportation equipment, automobiles and auto 
parts, despite the slight tariff reduction, are expected to increase due to each 
country’s heavy reliance on these products. Exports of medical supplies, 
24 USITc, U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement: Potential Economy-wide and Selected 
Sectoral Effects, Investigation No.TA-2104-24, September 2007.
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medical equipment, and other high-tech products are also expected to 
increase considering the policy improvements from the KoRUS FTA. 
The USITc predicts that the US will experience an increase of Korean 
imports, especially textiles, clothing, shoes, machinery, electronics, 
automobiles, and auto parts. However, even if the US increases Korean 
imports, due to the income diversion effects and for other reasons, the 
negative effects on US domestic employment and production will be less 
than 1%. In the case of automobiles, the USITc concludes that despite 
Korea’s automobile exports to the US, the KoRUS FTA effects on American 
automobile industry employment and production will be limited due to the 
income diversion effect. 
d. Evaluation On Economic Effects Figures
The USITc report mostly analyzes the KoRUS FTA effects on the American 
economy, and although there may be different views on the figures, generally 
the figures are very similar to those in the studies conducted in Korea. Many 
evaluate the economic effects of the KoRUS FTA negatively and point out 
its inequity. Tae In Jung (2007) stated that “something that shouldn’t have 
started in the first place got started and ultimately settled. But it is still 
rational to stop it. one fundamental of economics is that being regretful of 
locked expenses and insisting on incorrect decisions will incur bigger losses. 
Thus, what is the best way to straighten things out? The answer is rather 
simple: stop the KoRUS FTA, like the Korea-Japan FTA. congress cannot 
present an agreement, postpone it indefinitely, or reject the ratification of the 
agreement.”25
The part that needs the most discussion in terms of its economic analysis 
figures is the part concerning the relationship between FTA openings and 
industrial productivity. In the early stages of industrialization, an infancy 
stage of industrialization may seem to be beneficial; however, in the middle 
stages of industrialization, one can expect an increase of productivity or other 
economic effects due to openings. In case of Korea, a nation that climbed 
the ladder to become one of the world’s top-10 economies, it is apparent that 
25 chung, Tae In “KoRUS FTA, What to Do Now?” Incheon councilor’s Members 
Association Seminar Presentation Documents, 2007.
74 Korean Social Sciences Review | Vol. 2, No. 1, 2012
further openings will increase its productivity and competiveness. There 
are number of studies that support such an argument. The most renowned 
studies include Lawrence and Weinstein (1999), Pavcnik (2002), Baggs et 
al. (2002), Woo et al. (2003), the World Bank (2005), Fernandes (2006), and 
Lee (2007). The Lawrence and Weinstein (1999) study shows that Japan and 
Korea’s productivity increase is largely due to the stimulation of competition 
through import expansions and technology investment expansions. Also, Si 
Wook Lee’s (2007) study shows that with a 1% import tariff rate decrease in 
Korea, productivity at individual businesses increases on average by 1.5%. 
As shown in Table 8, market openings increase industrial productivity 
in dynamic ways. Trade liberalization increases the pressure of competition, 
but the increased competition pressure decreases corporate production and 
management ineffectiveness, cultivates innovative capabilities, increases 
international technology transfers, lowers import capital good costs, and 
extends research and development (R&D). “considering that Korean 
manufacturing industry’s standard tariff rates are within 4-6%, the productivity 
boost from the KoRUS FTA is expected to increase by at least 0.9-1.4% (Lee, S. 
2007).”
Table 8. Productivity growth channel via Market opening Means through 
Productivity growth channel Main Trading Types Trading Partner









growing attraction of tech-
nology investment




Intra- and Inter-Industry 
Flow of Production Factors




R&D effects Rise in international tech-
nology transfer
Import & direct in-
vestment
Advanced nation
Price reduction in import-
ed capital goods
Import Advanced nation
Data: Lee, Si-Wook (2007).
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Therefore, estimating only the direct effects of the tariff reduction on 
trade is underestimating the full economic effects of the KoRUS FTA. Such 
narrow approaches are the main reasons behind the differences between the 
KIEP and the DLP studies. Specifically, the KIEP study includes investment 
and services liberalization, which show a positive improvement to the Korean 
economy; in contrast, the DLP study shows that most effects of KoRUS FTA 
are rather harmful to the Korean economy. As a result, despite the optimistic 
estimation of the tariff elimination, the DLP plays up the negative effects of 
the policy improvement, which has become their main point of contention 
for rejecting the KoRUS FTA.
The DLP forecasts that the total damages from the pharmaceutical patent 
extensions, copyright extensions, neutralization of drug cost rationalization 
measures, and trade adjustment costs, among other issues, are between 10.77 
trillion won and 11.17 trillion won. The DLP only calculates the part that 
considers the possible short-term damage and neglects the long-term benefits. 
For example, the pharmaceutical patent extension ultimately increases Korea 
Table 9. The Democratic Labor Party’s Assessment of Economic Effects of the KoRUS 
FTA
Section Scenario 1 Scenario 2
Production Real gDP¹ Up 0.22%
(Addition of KRW 
956.4 billion)
Up 0.28%
(Addition of KRW 
1.186.9 billion)
Income Extension of pharmaceutical pat-
ents
Reduction of KRW 
5,881.1 billion
Reduction of KRW 
5,881.1 billion
Extension of copyrights Reduction of KRW 
211.1 billion
Reduction of KRW 
211.1 billion
Nullification of ‘Drug Expenditure 
Rationalization Plan’
Reduction of KRW 
5,764.6 billion
Reduction of KRW 
5,764.6 billion
Trade adjustment costs Reduction of KRW 
1,226.8 billion
Reduction of KRW 
1,283.7 billion
Rise or fall of personal disposable income Reduction of KRW 
12.127.2 billion
Reduction of KRW 
11.953.6 billion
Data: Democratic Labor Party, “Assessment of the KoRUS FTA’s Impact on Economy and 
Legal Systems,” 2007.
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business’ patent development incentives. Also, according to the patent-license 
connections and information protections, domestic firms that depend on 
generic pharmaceutical products may experience product launch delays. 
According to estimations by the Korea Health Industry Development Institute 
(KHIDI), strengthening of intellectual property rights and tariff eliminations 
reduce the anticipated sales of domestic pharmaceutical companies by 57-
100 billion won (for five years, approximately 280-500 billion won). However, 
the DLP study argues that the amount of damage is ten times more than that 
noted by the KHIDI. 
Today, it is widely known that the inclusive economic effects of FTAs 
arise mostly from economic policy improvements and not necessarily from 
tariff eliminations. Specifically, for developing countries, the effects of policy 
improvements and deregulations appear to be more prominent. Ultimately, 
the problems pointed out by the DLP on KIEP studies can be a result of the 
DLP’s biased perspectives on deregulations and the policy improvement 
aspects of the KoRUS FTA. cheong (2006), Ko (2007), and others view the 
policy improvements of the KoRUS FTA to be rather optimistic.26
It is also true that there is a need to improve the methods that reflect 
the productivity improvements of the analysis model, as the DLP points 
out. However, it is in fact not easy to reflect the numerous factors related 
to productivity in the FTA agreement. It is possible to reflect a couple of 
specific policy improvement factors in the models. Thus, the KIEP study 
reflects general productivity improvements externally in its model. The 
DLP views the external nature of the KIEP’s decision to reflect productivity 
improvements to be arbitrary; externalities are more straightforward in 
the estimation process, but the productivity of production factors, along 
with externalizing models, can become an issue. As such, there is a need to 
develop an estimation method that does not use the externalization factor or 
26 According to Jong-Hwan Ko’s analysis (2007), the KoRUS FTA will raise the South 
Korean gDP by 1.2% within a year, increasing it to 4% within 10 years. The effects of 
the tariff elimination are 0.4% within a year and 0.8% within 10 years, which shows 
generally productive effects. This study referenced the KIET research results that 
showed an increase of total factor productivity (TFP) by 0.5% for every 1% increase in 
imports. Ko’s study also used an annual increase rate of American imports of 0.1% as 
the productivity improvement index.
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productivity increase assumptions. An alternative may be to change the basis 
of the model to include the internalization of the change in productivity or 
a more elastic supply of production factors. An analysis of the latter case is a 
bit easier than that of the case before it. Both the KIEP and the DLP studies’ 
production factors are assumed as inelastic, with full employment as their 
caveat. This paper uses a cgE model that assumes the inelasticity of the 
production factors to estimate the economic effects of the KoRUS FTA.27
Both the KIEP and the DLP use the industrial tariff reduction rates to 
estimate the economic effects of the KoRUS FTA. KIEP researched the actual 
negotiation results, item by item, to assume the complete tariff reduction 
of the manufacturing industry, with the exception of the chemical industry 
and in the agriculture industry, with grains at 94%, fruits and vegetables 
at 39%, and meat at 46%. In addition, it includes in the estimation process 
the productivity improvement of the manufacturing and service industries 
stemming from policy improvements. The DLP set up two different scenarios; 
under scenario 1, it was assumed that tariffs on agriculture products were 
reduced by 60-80% (rice was exempt) and tariffs on textiles with a strict 
product specific rule attached were only reduced by 20% out of the total 
implement tariff. In scenario 2, it was assumed that tariffs on all goods, with 
the exception of rice, were eliminated. 
This study references both the KIEP and the DLP studies to set up two 
analysis models and six economic effect assumption scenarios, combining 
a total of three tariff reduction assumptions. First, the analysis models use 
the traditional gTAP, which was used by the DLP, an inelastic supply of 
productivity factors cgE model (basic/standard) and an elastic productivity 
factor cgE model (elastic model) to analyze the economic effects of the 
KoRUS FTA. Also, this study introduced three tariff reduction assumptions 
used by the two institutions. As in the KIEP study, this study agrees with the 
argument that many parts of the FTA economic effects stem from service 
industry improvements, but because the DLP study did not include the 
service industry, this study did not consider the service industry. 
27 Like Itakura, Hertel, and Reimer (2003), this study introduced factor productivity 
endogenization. This research uses the method in which productivity is not 
influenced; rather, productivity factor supplies are endogenized.  
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<Table 11> suggests an FTA economic effect that was derived from the 
two models (basic/standard and elastic) and the tariff reduction assumptions 
(<Table 10>). According to the gTAP model, which is very similar to the 
model used by the DLP, the Korea gDP is expected to increase by 0.33-0.46%, 
whereas, according to the elastic production factor model, which was used as 
an alternative to the KIEP model, the Korea gDP is estimated to increase by 
2.12-2.98%, showing large differences in the economic effects of the KoRUS 
FTA depending on the model. The DLP study assumes a small textile opening 
range while also assuming wide agriculture liberalization, which estimates a 
much larger economic effect than the KIEP study regardless of the model it 
uses. 
If one looks only at the economic effects of tariff eliminations, <Table 11> 
the estimations are not much different from that of the KIEP and the DLP 
studies.28 The DLP report states that “the KIEP reports that the real gDP, 
28 For this, the reader is invited to compare the figures shown in <Table 11> and the 
figures in the table below.
Table 10. Assumption of Tariff Reduction











Data: combined assumptions sourced from the KIEP (2007) and the Democratic Labor 
Party’s study (2007).
Table 11. Estimated Results of the KoRUS FTA’s Effects on Korean gDP growth
Assumption of tariff reduction
KIEP Democratic Labor Party
Full 
Liberalization
Assumption of supply 
of production factors
Standard Model 0.33 0.41 0.46
Flexible Model 2.12 2.48 2.98
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according to the basic model, is expected to increase by 0.42% and that the 
real gDP, according to the accumulation of wealth model, is expected to 
increase by 1.99%, which shows a large gap,” but the current study, which used 
an elastic model and the complete liberalization of tariff assumption, shows 
that the real gDP can increase to 2.98%, suggesting that the KIEP figures 
are actually underestimated. However, the 2.98% increase suggested in this 
study, which is approximately half of KIEP’s 5.97% maximum increase, arises 
because the study does not include service sector productivity improvement 
assumptions. Therefore, according to the analysis by the author of this article, 
there are no significant differences between the KIEP and the DLP studies. 
It seems that because the DLP study compartmentalized the 57 industries 
in the gTAP model used, the economic effects were underestimated. The 
usual cgE model study compartmentalizes one nation’s economy into 12-
15 industries. There hasn’t been a single cgE study conducted thus far that 
compartmentalizes gTAP 57 industries. 
2. Qualitative Evaluation of the KORUS FTA
The pros and cons of the KoRUS FTA have been suggested numerous times 
through the press and in many articles. However, the Korea’s domestic 
qualitative evaluations of the KoRUS FTA have been rather radical in 
comparison to the American perspective on it. The most prominent pro-
KoRUS FTA publications include “KoRUS FTA, the Right choice for 
the Future,” published by the KoRUS FTA civil Measures committee 
(2007); “KoRUS FTA, Industrial Evaluations of Negotiation Results and its 
 The Impact of the KoRUS FTA’s Tariff Elimination Envisaged by the KIEP and the 
Democratic Labor Party
(Unit: % change vs. gDP)
Section Standard Model capital Accumulation Model
Democratic Labor Party’s Scenario








 Data: Democratic Labor Party, “Assessment of the KoRUS FTA’s Impact on Economy 
and Legal Systems”, 2007.
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Implications for Korean Businesses,” by cheong, I. et al. (2007); and “KoRUS 
FTA, Korea Report,” by Sung-Lin Na (2006, compiled) and others. The most 
prominent anti-KoRUS FTA publications include “KoRUS FTA, citizens’ 
Report,” published by the Korean Alliance against the KoRUS FTA (2006); 
and “Unfamiliar colony, KoRUS FTA,” by Lee, H. (2006) and others. 
The publications from the anti-KoRUS FTA groups do include logically 
explained negative aspects of the KoRUS FTA, but it is true that most of 
these groups are fundamentally against neo-liberalism, understand the FTA 
as a representation of neo-liberalism, and therefore oppose the FTA itself. 
Thus, I would like to suggest an American scholar’s qualitative review of the 
KoRUS FTA and my own evaluation of it to attempt a qualitative analysis of 
the KoRUS FTA. 
a. Schott’s Evaluation
Jeffrey Schott is a world-renowned FTA analyst and a FTA scholar, and 
the institution that he belongs to, the Peterson Institute for International 
Economics, is the most highly reputable institution that researches and 
advises the US government with its trade policies. 
According to “The Korea-US Free Trade Agreement: A Summary 
Assessment,” by Jeffrey Schott (2007), the KoRUS FTA, which limits 
certain parts due to political reasons and minimizes openings, is not the 
‘best agreement,’ but Schott evaluates it as an agreement that can bring 
considerable mutual economic benefits and increased welfare to both nations. 
The KoRUS FTA is by far the most inclusive trade agreement since NAFTA, 
as it will bring the two nations closer economically. 
Schott argues that the KoRUS FTA also has security implications and 
other non-economic implications, which will enhance the Korea’s status in 
East Asia while bringing stability to the Korean peninsula, while also setting 
the direction for economic cooperation within East Asia. Schott ultimately 
suggests that the KoRUS FTA can serve as a milestone for the US to improve 
its understanding of the politics surrounding the Korean peninsula. Schott 
also states that East Asia is by far the most active “hotbed” where economic 
cooperation is most vigorous and that although the US has yet to secure a 
channel to get directly involved with the East Asian economic cooperation, 
the KoRUS FTA can lead the US to become more involved in East Asian 
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politics and in other relations. 
Schott agrees that the most important part of the KoRUS FTA is definitely 
the automobiles part. In 2006, automobile trades between the two nations 
totaled $11.6 billion dollars, and automobile trade (15%) clearly is of great 
importance as regards trade between the two countries. In the case of the 
total traded goods of the US, automobile imports from Korea stand at 24%, 
which is overwhelmingly high. Between 2001 and 2005, Korean automobile 
production increased from 2.95 million to 3.70 million, with 70% of 
them being exported. Within the same timeframe, American automobile 
production decreased, and due to foreign companies’ increased construction 
and use of US-based factories, total production was maintained at about 
12.00 million automobiles. Automobile industry laborers account for 9% 
out of the total employment (Korea: 0.25 million, US: 1.10 million29), and 
both nations’ automobile labor unions are very critical of the KoRUS FTA. 
The Korean automobile labor union takes on more of a political struggle 
characteristic. Its counterpart, the American automobile labor union, clearly 
takes a protectionist stance, being fearful of the fall of general manufacturing 
employment and the steady decline of employment in the automobile 
industry. Also, due to foreign automobiles entering the American market, the 
Big 3 market share has shrunk, and foreign companies tend to have a lower 
labor union membership rate, which has ultimately reduced the unionized 
wage premium. Labor unions, especially those from Ford and chrysler, are 
exceptionally against the KoRUS FTA, whereas gM, which bought Daewoo, 
is rather hopeful. generally, the American labor unions are concerned mostly 
about the opening of the market itself. 
In the case of automobiles, the current structure is rather unilateral, 
favoring Korean exports, which has been a growing issue that is continuously 
pointed out by the American Democratic Party; although the Korean 
government eliminated tariffs early on and reorganized the automobile tariff, 
there is a chance that Korean automobile exports may destabilize the current 
trade balance. Ford and chrysler argue that Korean policies and tariffs are 
unfair when it comes to exports of larger automobile, but Schott evaluates 
29 In the case of the US, jobs in the assembly, body, and parts industries number 0.25 
million, 0.18 million, and 67 million, respectively.
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that such an argument is not appropriate because American domestic sales of 
larger automobiles accounts for 40% of all automobile sales. 
Agriculture accounts for 3% of all trades between the two nations, but it 
was the most sensitive issue during the negotiation. The Korea government 
set the rice market exception as its foundation during the negotiations, and 
the US government ultimately decided to accept the Korean demands for 
political benefits and because the economic profit in the rice market was 
rather small. The US government set beef exports as one of its major demands 
during the negotiations, and the two nations sought to resolve the beef export 
quarantine problem, though these efforts were halted during the negotiations 
due to the mad-cow disease outbreak. Schott sees that partial liberalization of 
the agriculture industry was settled due to the agriculture protectionist stance 
that the Korea decided to maintain, but negotiations ultimately allowed 
American agriculture products to enter the Korean market. 
Schott optimistically evaluates the base preparation for the US to enter the 
Korean market with its financial, consignment and professional services (e.g., 
legal, accounting) and its other service industries. He also similarly evaluates 
the communication, film, and broadcasting deregulations and increased 
investment shares. Schott forecasts that the aforementioned service and 
investment industry improvements may benefit US companies but ultimately 
feels that the Korean employees and laborers in those industries will benefit 
the most. Recognition problems associated with Kaesong Industrial complex 
products were settled by allowing an oPZ, and the two nations are expected 
to solve further problems later through working-level talks. Both nations 
understood that the Kaesong Industrial complex could contribute to East 
Asian cooperation and stability, and also positively to American North 
Korean policies. 
Schott sees the KoRUS FTA as having a considerable effect on not only 
the economic benefits of both nations but also on the economies of other 
Asia-Pacific nations. The KoRUS FTA can stimulate FTAs between various 
nations, the most prominent example of this being the Korea-EU FTA. East 
Asia-EU trade has become more active within the last few years, but the 
danger of a decrease in trade has been the key potential threat due to the 
number of FTAs that the EU is not a part of. Such a potential threat propelled 
the US to promote the KoRUS FTA more actively, which stimulated the EU 
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to push forward an FTA with Korea as its first FTA partner. Additionally, the 
EU is looking into the possibility of establishing an FTA with the ASEAN 
countries and India, and china is requesting to establish an FTA with Korea. 
In September of 2007, china announced the beginning of china-India FTA 
negotiations. 
Schott foresees a considerable effect of the KoRUS FTA on Japan as well. 
The KoRUS FTA can serve as a factor that will expedite Japanese agricultural 
reform. In the case of the Korea-EU FTA settlement, the Japanese government 
may resume the indefinitely postponed Korea-Japan FTA talks. Japan has 
been reviewing the possibility of entering into an FTA with the US for many 
years now, but the limits put on Japanese agricultural reform and the lack of 
a will to promote this measure have been the main causes of the stagnation. 
In April of 2007, the Abe-Bush summit talks postponed the possibility of the 
Japan-US FTA indefinitely. 
The KoRUS FTA is expected to have positive effects on the Free Trade 
Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP), but its short-term effects are expected to 
be weak. However, the status of the ASEAN, which has functioned as the 
main hub among the large FTAs, including the ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and 
FTAAP, is expected to decline. The ASEAN lacks internal cooperation, and 
each member state’s dynamic economic structure, as well as its lack of central 
force, will limit its role as the hub of an enormous FTA.
b. The Author’s Evaluation
The KoRUS FTA negotiation, which began in June 2006, did not make much 
progress, even until late 2006, due to the differences in opinion between 
the two nations and due to the political pressure coming from the wide 
market-opening nature of the agreement. Also, the growth of KoRUS FTA 
opposition in Korea, along with the mad-cow disease outbreak, did not help 
either. However, starting in 2007, representatives from both countries decided 
to accommodate each other’s demands to a bearable degree, which aided in 
settling many disputes by the end of March of 2008 (actually April 2, 2008), 
as planned. Meanwhile, the American Democratic Party, which won an 
overwhelming victory in the midterm elections, proposed a new trade act to 
the Republican administration, requesting the new trade act to be reflected in 
the agreement that was already settled. The government of the Korea decided 
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to accommodate the American demands after determining that the new trade 
act, composed of environmental and labor contents, does not change the 
standing agreement significantly. 
I expect the KoRUS FTA effects to be dynamic in various aspects, which 
will ultimately have an extensive economic effect, as the US is one of the 
Korea’s largest trading partners, and because mutual trade between the two 
countries has been complementary. According to Woo, c. et al. (2003), Korea-
US trade is mainly “a trade of goods with different qualities.” Furthermore, 
oh, S. (2006) states that the Korea-US trade already includes an extensive 
volume of high-technology goods, and the complementary division of labor 
characteristics of trade is so evident that the increase in trade is expected to 
have high level of benefits with minimal damage. 
Even the Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade (KIET) finds 
that the “Korea-US trade, in all industrial aspects, has a high win-win, 2006 
possibility of producing an international division of labor structure with 
minimal competition among industries.” As noted in Table 12, the US tends 
to have comparative advantages in IT, BT, other new-technology industries, 
and the high-tech parts and materials industries, whereas the Korea has 
Table 12. comparative Advantages in Korea-US Manufacturing Industries
Industry Korean comparative Advantages American comparative Advantages
Wooden Furniture Low- & Mid-Priced Furniture Lumber, Raw Material
Petrochemistry general Purpose goods High Value Products
Textile Low- & Mid-Priced general 
Purpose goods
Industrial Textile
Steel general Purpose goods Scrap
communication 
Device
Mobile Devices Major Parts, communications
Semiconductor Memory Non-Memory
Automobile Small & Mid-Sized Vehicles, Parts Large Luxury Vehicles
Planes Plane Parts complete Planes
Shipbuilding Merchant Vessels Leisure Boats
Source: Korea Institute for Industrial Economics & Trade (2006).
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comparative advantages in textiles, steel, electronics, shipbuilding, and other 
traditional industries. generally, Korea-US trade is complementary.
In 2006, total US imports were the world’s largest, at $1.86 trillion dollars, 
and its market in 2006 currency standards is 16 times that of Korea, at 14 
trillion dollars. It is true that BRIcs and other new markets are important, 
but the Korea should put more weight on maintaining its current status in 
the US market and furthermore should assume leadership in trade in order 
to secure a world-renowned reputation. From such a standpoint, the Korean 
automobile industry and textile industry finalized a considerable amount of 
the negotiation results. 
The primary economic effect of the KoRUS FTA on Korea will be 
generated from the increase in exports to the US. The two nations have 
agreed to eliminate tariffs on 100% of traded goods. Tariffs on 94% of traded 
goods were set to be eliminated early (within 3 years) by agreement. once the 
KoRUS FTA takes full effect and eliminates the 4.9% of the tariff pressure, 
Korea will gain an opportunity to improve the current situation, in which it 
lags behind products from china and other developing countries. In addition, 
an additional US government procurement market was opened due to the 
agreement to reduce the current 0.2 million dollar federal government service 
bounded lower limit to 0.1 million dollars. As the KoRUS FTA is expected 
to help Korea gain recognition in the auction participation process in the US, 
the US procurement market barrier should be lowered. It is generally known 
that the US procurement market is extremely difficult to enter. However, 
because the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion corporation (KoTRA) and 
other export promoting institutions are promoting measures to enter the 
US procurement market, the situation appears hopeful for anxious Korean 
businesses. 
opening of the service and the investment industries was limited and 
centered around industries that exert less pressure on Korea industries. All of 
the regulation authority of the government on education, medical and other 
social and public services was inclusively deferred to disallow additional 
openings. In the case of broadcasting services, foreign investment admittance 
on ground-wave, satellite broadcasting, cable, and program providers (PP) 
was kept at the current level. Regulations on direct investment by program 
providers were to be eliminated within three years. Foreign investment 
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in telecommunication carriers was to be kept at the current share limit of 
49%, but for carriers besides KT and SKT, 100% of foreign investment was 
allowed two years after the agreement goes into effect. considering the highly 
saturated Korean domestic telecom market, the Korean industry needs to aim 
to enter the world’s largest market, the American telecom market, instead of 
settling domestically. Furthermore, American program providers entering 
the Korean market will most likely make it possible for Korean program 
providers to export Korean program contents to the US. 
The recently discussed FTA focuses quite heavily on the enhancement of 
economic regulations. Most nations face problems regarding policy reforms 
and how they slow the overall progress of reform. However, one of the FTA’s 
greatest advantages is that it includes reform assignments as a part of the 
agreement, which then expedites the reform process. Apart from this, the 
KoRUS FTA is helpful for Korea because it strengthens the transparency 
of the economy, boosts efficiency, improves legal procedures, and improves 
other systems in dynamic ways.
Regulation improvements, in the long term, help the Korean economy, 
whereas in the short term they may burden Korean industries. Traditionally, 
the agriculture industry is most vulnerable to opening. It was forecasted 
before, during negotiations, that the full opening of the agriculture industry 
was inevitable, but the negotiated agreement maintained the standing high-
tariff structure through quotas, seasonal tariffs and other means. Nonetheless, 
the direct damage expected to be incurred owing to beef, pork and other 
meat imports is a concern. 
In the case of intellectual property, the fact that the copyright protection 
period was extended from 50 years to 70 years after the death of the author 
does seem to have reflected the American demands, but rationalized patent 
examinations, trademark protection, and other intellectual property related 
policies are ways to strengthen Korean competiveness in the global market. 
This will expand the added value of Korean intellectual property rights, as 
created by the Korean wave and other factors. It has also established the 
grounds for Korea to request intellectual property rights protection from 
china and other Southeast Asian nations that increasingly violate Korean 
intellectual property rights. 
For the labor and environmental areas of the KoRUS FTA, the two nations 
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agreed to check and efficiently carry out their duties to uphold internationally 
acknowledged labor and environmental rights. Negotiation results concerning 
the labor and environment areas were set at the level of checking domestic 
practices and regulations but not nearly at the level at which domestic firms 
bear heavy burdens. 
Such regulation improvements usually do not show benefits immediately, 
but rather, the benefits appear in practice in the forms of eliminated 
unnecessary policies in business management, reduced uncertainty, and 
eliminated unnecessary costs. For foreign investors, such characteristics are 
especially attractive, as they simplify their decision-making process.
Meanwhile, those opposing the KoRUS FTA have their reasons. Many 
simply take it for granted that opposition arises from the economic loss aspect 
of the FTA, but there are a handful of organizations that oppose entering into 
an FTA with the US from an ideological standpoint. In fact, simply speaking, 
the labor unions that foster the strengthening of labor rights and standards 
have no reason to oppose the KoRUS FTA, which fulfills their desires, but 
they oppose it anyway, with temporary employment as their main argument 
against the agreement. In addition, for the opposing party, the investor-
state dispute issue is one of the most toxic provisions, which ultimately 
fuels their strong argument that the KoRUS FTA is an American attempt 
to spread neoliberal policies around the globe. However, according to many 
professionals in the field of international investment, previous FTAs in which 
Korea is a party, such as the Korea-chile FTA, the Korea-Singapore FTA, and 
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), contained all of the “toxic” 
elements that fuel the opposing arguments. Furthermore, the so-called “toxic” 
provisions and elements showed up in over 4,000 investment agreements, 
showing that such provisions and elements are indeed not as harmful as the 
opposing arguments present them, or are not harmful at all. According to the 
actual contents of the investment, the government allows ISD provisions to 
take effect only in cases of severely unfair domestic policies greatly damaging 
a foreign company. In the ten years since NAFTA went into effect, there was 
only one such case, which shows that the opposing arguments fueled by the 
negative effects of ISD are exaggerated. Nonetheless, it is important to realize 
that the ISD provisions prevent a government from arbitrarily introducing a 
policy. 
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The implementation of the KoRUS FTA may bring some degree of 
hardship to less competitive industries and businesses. once the agreement 
takes full effect, those industries with relatively strong competitiveness 
will react with joy, while others will do so with disappointment. Also, 
during the industrial restructuring process, some may experience short-
term unemployment and stagnation. To accommodate such damages, 
social conflicts and confrontations must be rationally arbitrated. In order to 
minimize the implementation of the FTA and maximize its effects, the less-
competitive industries must be accommodated with rational compensation 
for their loss. 
Especially in the agriculture industry, damages may occur in one area 
or another; however, it is generally expected that the standing agricultural 
infrastructure will not collapse. The areas expected to suffer the most are 
beef, pork, and tangerines. Demands for imported beef may increase in 
Korea due to the beef tariff elimination; it is expected that US beef will 
replace the current Australian beef imported into Korea. In the case of pork, 
approximately ¼ of all pork consumption in Korea is said to rely on imports. 
In particular, pork belly imports are distributed most commonly in Korea. 
Due to the tariff elimination on pork, American pork imports may increase, 
and it is likely that American pork will replace imports from third-world 
countries. overall, net income will increase to a certain degree and will incur 
some damage, but the damage will not be severe enough to collapse Korean 
production. Nonetheless, Korean government should take the potential 
damage of this agreement into consideration and set complementary 
measures with congress. 
V. coNcLUSIoN
Korean government, in its 17th congress, announced the intention to 
ratify the KoRUS FTA but failed to do so due to the April 18th controversy 
surrounding the beef quarantine standards negotiation results. As a result, the 
18th congress inherited the burden to ratify the agreement, and in accordance 
with the normalization of congress on August 19th of this year, the KoRUS 
FTA deliberation process will take place. 
 Economic Assessment of the KoREA–US FTA 89
In early 2008, the United Democratic Party leadership that succeeded the 
(old) Uri Party openly suggested that the KoRUS FTA should be ratified. 
However, due to the linking of the beef controversy and the agreement 
ratification, ratification has not been and will not be an easy task. In 
accordance with the June 26th standards, US beef is being distributed in 
Korea, which makes it difficult to understand how the beef issue is delaying 
the KoRUS FTA ratification.
The beef quarantine standard controversy has, however, led many Koreans 
to put more emphasis on domestic negotiations regarding international trade 
negotiations. FTAs, beef, and other sensitive international trade negotiations 
require a gathering of opinions and a sharing of information between all of 
those concerned, including civil society and other interested parties. This 
year, the importance of government-to-people communications is being 
mentioned, but a plan to mediate such communication effectively has yet 
to rise to the surface. It is not easy to hope for harmonious communication 
between the government and the people simply by strengthening Blue 
House press functions, and Korean government must implement a plan 
systematically to collect public opinions on the KoRUS FTA from the stage of 
the founding of the agreement to the stage of its settlement. 
The delaying of the ratification of the KoRUS FTA will also delay the 
benefits that come from it.30 Not only is the content of the FTA important, 
but also its implementation timeframe is important as it is connected to 
the maximum economic results. The current political situation will most 
likely not allow the 18th congress to ratify the agreement easily, but the 
US administration is showing a strong desire to use its lame-duck session 
between November, after the presidential elections, and the end of the year to 
ratify the KoRUS FTA. Thus, the Korea congress should ratify the agreement 
before the US and pressure the US to do the same. Furthermore, there is 
a need to develop logical complimentary measures for one government to 
30 Most of our prominent corporations are for the KoRUS FTA. In addition, approximately 
71% of the small and medium size businesses answered optimistic or neutral about the 
KoRUS FTA. (’06.3, Korea Institute for Industrial Economics and Trade). The small 
and medium size businesses answered that the most optimistic effects of the KoRUS 
FTA are, increase in exports to the US (67.6%), high quality raw materials imports at a 
reduced costs (15.9%), and promotion of Korea-US joint venture (6.4%).
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convince its congress, and the Korea administration must request that the US 
administration take a more active role in attempting an early ratification of 
the KoRUS FTA. The Korea congress should also stop relying on nearsighted 
domestic politics and instead increase international exchanges, riding the 
globalization current to affirm its national interests. 
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